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ARCANA AULICA:

OR,

WALSINGHAM'S MANUAL

OF

PRUDENTIAL MAXIMS

FOR THE

STATESMAN AND THE COURTIER.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY T. C. 1655.

LONDON: REPRINTED FOR W. S.

AND SOLD BY G. AND W. NICOL, PALL-MALL; LONGMAN, HURST, REES, AND ORME, PATERNOSTER-ROW; AND J. W. RICHARDSON, CORNHILL.

1810.

Price Four Shillings.

BIBLIOTHECA
REGIA
MONACENSIS.

London: Printed by W. Bulmer and Co.
Cleveland-row, St. James's.

THE

PRINTER

TO THE

DISCREET AND UNDERSTANDING

READER.

HERE is a Child of Chance, who like another *Moses* in a wicker basket, was lately put to sea; and by the hand of Providence guided to this shore, as to *Pharoah's* daughter; by the taking of a small *Irish* pirate, in which it was found, and appearing a babe both promising, and very beautiful, was recommended to me to nurse. Of what birth it is, I can give no certain account: all that I can assure you of is this, that having

perused it through, some very knowing persons have affirmed, that our language is yet enriched with nothing upon this subject equal to it. The cloaths that it was wrapped in, tend little towards the discovery of its parents; for it was directed as a present to *Ormond*, the titular Viceroy of *Ireland*, from one *Walsingham*; who, though he professes to have given it this English habit it now wears, yet is able to name no father for it: whether it be some nameless author, as he affirms, who first gave it light, I must of necessity leave that as doubtful as I found it: and it is a needless curiosity to inquire further, since no man is injured in that concealment, but the author; who it seems is well content to lose the glory of it. What value this *Walsingham* sets upon it, you may read in a part of his Letter to *Ormond*, which I here insert.

Your Excellency will herewith receive a piece, that if not too much lessened in passing through, and from the hand that sends it, is truly not unworthy the acceptance even of so great a Person. It is some years since I first met with it in manuscript, and in a foreign language, when I took so great a fancy to it, that it has ever since been an inseparable companion, a daily Manual *to me: I have since that time found it published in* Latin, *but still as nameless as at our first acquaintance. I much lamented the divulging it, for a twofold reason; one was, to see it come abroad so lamely, and so much injured; the other, to find it divulged at all: for surely it is a tract not intended for the unskilful palate of the vulgar; and indeed, only meant, and fit for the wisest souls, and the maturest and best tempered judgments. And the most*

part of men are either by nature so depraved, that they cannot forbear the practice of those evils that they find discoursed upon, only for their instruction; or else so sand-blind and ignorant, that they must needs be scandalized with, and stumble at those Precepts which are here recommended to no man's practice, but laid by the author's skilful hand, as necessary sea-marks upon the shelves of danger and deceit; of which, the ocean of the public life (God knows), is full. And a little after he adds, *in this small Volume you will find* (my Lord) *enchaced skilfully together as precious jewels, the choicest precepts that story and experience both together, have produced for the instruction of those who move within the sphere of business, and the Court; it is a curious landscape, wherein that great territory, with all the blemishes and beauties of it, is all contracted to an easy view:*

it is a perfect compass fitted to those seas, with points adapted to every wind that blows there: it is an exact card, describing all the coast; and as there is not a road, a creek, or harbour, overpast in all that channel; so is there not a rock, a flat, or quicksand that is omitted: but surely it is done to keep us from, and not to lead us to those dangers, &c.

This, and more he delivers in commendation of it; and what he says, cannot but be of some authority in the case: since upon inquiry I find, that he is one, who though very young, in a little time grew up (under the wings and favor of Lord *Digby*), to such credit with the late King, that he was admitted to the greatest trusts; and prevented only by the fall of the Court itself, from climbing to a more eminent height.

This much, Reader, I thought fit to say for your satisfaction, and by way

of civility to him ; contrary to whose design I have published this *Treatise*, and until another a father can be found for it, have prefixed his name to it, under the title of his *Manual*.

Farewell.

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ARCANA AULICA,

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WALSINGHAM'S MANUAL

OF PRUDENTIAL MAXIMS FOR THE STATESMAN AND THE COURTIER.

CHAP. I.

The several Ends of Courtiers, and the Means to maintain them.

It is necessary that all men, who desire with prudence and order, to govern their affairs, do in the first place, propose to themselves an *end*, whereunto all their actions must tend. Those who look towards the *Court*, do not all fix upon the same ends; some the hope of gain, and others the desire of honour leads; the *ambition of rule* draws not a few; and many steer that course merely out of a busy inclination, to the engrossing, crossing, or interposing in other men's

affairs; whilst the number of those is very small, who primitively intend the honour, safety, and advantage of the Prince.

But though their *ends* be diverse, yet the *way* to attain to whatever *end* any man there has pitched upon, is but one, and common to all who move in that *sphere*, to wit, the favour of the Prince; in obtaining *which*, the industry and labor of all *Courtiers* is employed. In order whereunto it is in the first place necessary, that you be *known* to your Prince: and then either by your *behaviour* your *parts*, your *actions*, or some other laudable means, that you make yourself *grateful* in his eye: yet there are *those* for whom the *splendor* of their family, the *authority* of their *office*, or *convenience* of their employment (whether it be high or low, come to them by inheritance, or got with money) has prepared an access to the Prince's person; so that they being hereby exempted from the toil of seeking how to become *known* to the *Prince*, find half their work performed to their hands; whilst those to whom

these introductions are denied, find their greatest difficulties in their first beginnings: but when they are once *known* to the *Prince*, as he judges them fit for his service, they are often preferred and trusted before others: by reason that being lifted up from a low condition, or a mean fortune, they are more addicted and subject to the Prince's will, whom they submissively reverence, as the only author of their advancement.

It is otherwise with Courtiers that are born great; for upon those the dignity either of their employment, or their family, imposes a necessity of having a regard to their *own honour*, and of preferring sometimes their own to the Prince's opinion; who besides is oftener unwilling to promote *these* through a certain emulation, or fear, lest their *swelling greatness* should insult at last against him who is the Author of it, and he not able to repress them without danger to himself and his kingdom; whilst, on the other side, the *suppression* of him who rises from a mean condition is far more easy; only let the Prince

turn his back upon him, or abandon him to the great ones (who, for the most part, look with envy upon such), and *he is lost*. I intend here only those wise Princes who have known how to limit within due bounds the power of those they love, and advance; not conferring all the authority and trust of his kingdom upon one of these men, in subjecting even the peers to him; which having been done by some Princes, did seldom, or almost never, succeed well.

CHAP. II.

The Way to obtain the Prince's Favor.

THE ways whereby *Courtiers* get into authority and favor with the Prince, are two, above all others most usual and frequented. The one is of those that seek after public offices and dignities, climbing up the stairs of honor till they come within a stage of the favourite himself: the other is of those who follow the Court, sedulously seeking all occa-

sions of being employed in the secret affairs of the Prince, and made use of in business of the greatest trust.

The last of which ways is, without doubt, the shortest, and traced with their steps who have lived in the greatest favor with their Princes; as *Mecænas* was to *Augustus*, and *Sallust* both to him, and his successor *Tiberius*, of whom *Tacitus*, Annal. 3. *Sallust, although the ways of honor were easy to him, imitating* Mecænas, *without the senatorial dignity, outwent in power many that had been honored, both with triumphs and the consulship, and varying from the custom of the ancients through his delicacy, and neatness, seemed prone to nothing but the plenty and abundance of luxury; although he had indeed a vigorous mind, capable of the weightiest business; by so much the more sharp and active by how much the more he made shew of dulness and sloth.*

Like to him was *Mella*, of whom speaks the same *Tacitus*, Annal. 12: *Mella, born of the same parents that* Gallio *and* Seneca *were, through a preposterous ambition laid aside all pretence to public*

honors; that being only a Roman knight, he might equal in power those who had been Consuls; besides, he believed it the shortest way of getting money, to be employed in agencies, and soliciting the Prince's business.

CHAP. III.

The Ways to become known to the Prince.

THE ways of *becoming known* and grateful to the Prince, are various, according to the diversity of the Courtiers, and the times; there are some who make themselves known by their actions signally, either profitable, or glorious; or else by a more than common virtue and honesty. The commendation of others gives to many, both access to, and interest in, the Prince, which is indeed the most usual way of all. For Princes live in such a degree of eminence above others, and are so hedged in with the number of Peers, and train of *veteran Courtiers*, that a stranger can hardly thrust in

amongst the throng that stands in his way, unless either there be some one to take him by the hand, and make his passage, or else that himself, by some extraordinary *enterprise*, attracts the eyes of all men upon him, and amongst others, those of the Prince.

And here the fact of the architect *Dimacrates*, or, as some call him, *Stasicrates*, is very memorable. He desiring to become known to Alexander the Great, when all the *Courtiers* had refused to bring him to the king, bethinks of a way of presenting himself all naked, anointed with oil, a poplar crown on his head, upon his left shoulder a lion's skin, and holding a great club in his right hand; and thus accoutred he comes into *Alexander's* presence, as he was sitting in his throne. The novelty of the thing drew the eyes of all upon him, and moved *Alexander* himself so far, that he caused the man to be brought to him; and though he approved not of what he propounded, yet he commanded he should be enrolled amongst his family.

I do not bring this example to per-

suade any body, with the like foolery to insinuate himself into the Prince's favour, but to demonstrate, that those who are *strangers* and *unknown*, unless they are helped by some one in great authority, can hardly screw themselves into so great a train, as to surround the Prince, except either by some memorable action, as we have said before, or by some unusual accident, they deserve, as the Poet says,

With fingers to be pointed out
For some strange thing amongst the rout.

CHAP. IV.

The Humor and Inclinations of the Prince and his Familiars are to be known.

OUR *young Courtier*, who desires to be *known* and loved by the Prince, must observe well the manners and conditions, not only of the *Prince himself* but also of such of his *followers* as he most rests and relies on, together with the *Peers*, and all others who may either afford him

any help, or *countenance;* or else, on the contrary, stirred up either with emulation, fear, envy, hate, their own, or their friend's concernments, work him any prejudice. It is chiefly necessary that he make a full discovery of the inclinations and customs of the Prince, that for the most part concern the temperature of his body; which though by wary Princes they be much concealed, and smothered, yet it seldom happens but that sometimes they break out, and laying aside disguises, shew themselves. Since all their actions are so exposed to the eyes of men, some one or other must observe where their inclinations tend. Sometimes they are so oppressed and vexed with the weight of business, that forgetting their artifices, they betray their dispositions; *Tiberius* himself, although a most skilful master in dissembling, could not set so good a face upon it, but that time would by little and little bring all his arts to light.

But since those of other men are so many, the propensions of Princes must needs be diverse, and almost infinite; yet

they may be reduced to *two heads*. The one of which includes all that tends to the greatness of his State, the other his personal pleasures; his greatness consists either in his fame and authority, or in riches, the duty of his subjects, or, lastly, in the strength and faithfulness of his armies. In these things he ought to accommodate his endeavours to the nature, and disposition of the prince's affairs; which he that shall with dexterity and skill perform, provided be be neither suspected nor hated for other reasons, cannot fail of becoming acceptable to the Prince.

Make the same judgment of the pleasures and vitious affections of the Prince. If he be diffident and of a fearful disposition, believe that a bold informer will be grateful to him who sticks not at the displeasure of the great ones, and is ready to execute the Prince's commands, whatsoever they be; as *Tacitus* describes *Sejanus. He had a body* (says he, Annal. 4.) *patient of toil, a bold mind; he was a close concealer of himself, and a rash accuser of others; composed of a mixture of*

flattery and pride, with an exterior face of modesty; and yet inwardly fraught with an excess of ambition,

If the Prince delight in drunkenness, he will also take pleasure in men addicted to the same vice: for which cause *Tiberius* loved *Pomponius*, and *Lucius Piso*, of whom *Suetonius*, cap. 24. de Tiberio: *After this the Prince (to the corruption of public manners,) spent two whole days and nights, eating and drinking with* Pomponius Flaccus, *and* Piso: *to one of which he gave immediately the Province of* Syria, *and to the other the government of the city, calling them in his letters his most pleasant and familiar friends.* The same *Tiberius*, as *Suetonius* relates, preferred a most *ignoble fellow* to the *Questorship*, before many noble pretenders, because at a banquet, where himself was drinking, he drunk off nine gallons of wine.

Their society in their lust indeared *Tigellinus* to *Nero*. Tigellinus *was more powerful* (says *Tacitus*, Annal. 14.) *in the bosom of the Prince, being admitted to his most private lusts. So* Petronius, *that*

Master of Elegance (for those are the Historian's words, *Annal.* 16.) *was admitted amongst few to the familiarity of* Nero, *who thought nothing pleasant or sweet, but what* Petronius *approved of.* And according to this example, did *Commodus* and *Heliogabalus* confer all the dignities of the Empire upon men for lust and licentiousness most like themselves.

Mutianus was not beloved by *Vespatian* so much for his fidelity, duty, and the merit of his past services, as because he was more dexterous than others in feeding his avarice. To *Isacius Angelus*, who, after the death of *Theodorus*, got the Empire, the same avarice endeared a certain boy, who, though he scarce knew how to write, kept the accounts of his exchequer, out of hope only of sharing in the bribes, which were given him largely from all those who used his assistance.

Manuel Comnenus, also Emperor, seeking some rough exactor and crafty raiser of his tributes, who might supply his prodigality with money, chose *John Pucius*, a rude unsufferable man, difficult of access, and intolerable harsh,

Whose language, and whose looks did well
His nature and his office tell.

And not content with this, raised him to that authority, that he not only excelled all others in dignity, but also would dare to violate the edicts of the Prince, and orders of the Senate; abrogating, under pretence of increasing the Treasury, some of the greatest and most necessary offices of the Empire: such as was the Commander of the Gallies, the chief strength and defence of that imperial Monarchy.

CHAP. V.

The Prince's Affections whether, and how, to be complied with.

But that they who desire to become acceptable to the Prince, ought to sooth him in all his inclinations, is not only a thing publicly granted, but also authorized by the daily practice of Courtiers. An honest man will wonder at it, and think that by this rule that teaches us to

humor all the dispositions of the Prince, he is shut out from court; since Princes often go astray from the paths of reason and justice. Truly, he that desires to lead a life altogether innocent, and remote from the conversation of men addicted to vice, and to their own corrupt inclinations, will, in my opinion, do well to absent himself from that great courtesan, the Court (if I may so call it), which sometimes corrupts men of the greatest integrity and innocence.

Let us see an example or two of this corruption. *Festinus*, the friend of *Maximinus*, during *Valentinian's* reign, governed *Asia* with a wonderful repute of gentleness and modesty; being a sharp reprover of the violence and cruelties of *Maximinus*, and of the calumnies and frauds wherewith he circumvented many: but at last observing that his companion by these means had gotten the command of the Pretorian bands, next in dignity to the Emperor himself, he changed his manner of life, and imitating *Maximinus*, did many unjust and cruel things. *John Pucius* (whom I mentioned but

a little before) administered for a time the affairs and treasures of the Emperor *Manuel* with great integrity; which caused the Emperor's pride and inhumanity to be in some sort tolerable to those who were well disposed amongst the subjects; but at last (as *Nicetas* witnesses) giving himself over to the desire of wealth, he was in covetousness inferior to none that ever had borne those *offices* before him: exhorting his very *friends* and *servants*, to imitate his example, as many of them did; and the rest, though better and uncorrupted themselves, yet were fain silently to suffer *others* to be depraved, for fear of the danger that hung over those who should oppose him.

Aristides the *First*, both in name and nature, being by the *Athenians* made *treasurer*; in the first place, according to his own *disposition*, and the duty of an *honest man*, went about to hinder all those who were under his *charge*, from robbing the *Treasury*; whereupon they presently accused him of *cheating*, and *bribery*, as one of the most corrupt per-

sons that ever bore that office; so that he had like to have been *condemned:* but being at last *quit*, and his *office* still continued, he determined to *imitate* his *Predecessors*, and wink at the thefts of his *companions;* by which means he presently re-obtained the name of a *good man*, in the opinion of all.

Such things often fall out in the *Courts* of *Princes*, either through the *malice* of those who are in most authority, who can endure no man more virtuous than themselves; or else through the *folly* and *imprudence* of the *Prince.* The *preservation* of our *integrity* in *Court*, I confess, is therefore very difficult; yet if any, either through the *necessity* of his *fortune*, the *eminence* of his *birth*, the *dignity* of his *office*, or the desire of serving either his *friends* or *country*, is lead to it or called there by the *Prince*, shall undergo this kind of life, and as occasion shall require, seek to do good to himself, and serve his friends; in my judgment he may persist therein, without prejudice to his *upright heart*, at least for a time.

I speak of the *Courts* of the *worst*

Princes; for to live in the *Court* of a *wise Prince*, who loves *honest* and *virtuous men*, the difficulty is not so great. In times past, good men did not always undergo public employments with a desire of *doing service to their country* so much as to keep *wicked* and *corrupt men* out of those charges: and for the same reasons, ought they to seek access to *tyrannical* and *voluptuous Princes*; that if they durst not *directly*, at least *obliquely*, and as much as in them lay, they might impede the evil and pernicious *counsels* of the *Prince*, either by *framing delays*, and *contriving difficulties* in his way, or by offering him *more mild* and *plausible resolutions*.

Burrhus and *Seneca*, who, according to the rate of those times, were accounted not only good *Courtiers*, but *virtuous men*, being made *governors* of *Nero's* youth, they observed the humor of this *Prince* apt and prone to *lust* and *pleasure*, lest he should break out to the *rapes* of the *noblest women*, they permitted him a *mistress*, whereby for a time they kept him in order; who took into his famili-

arity *Annæus Serenus* for a cloak to his *lust, who faining to be in love with this freed woman, openly owned those gifts to be his* (says *Tacitus* Annal. 13.) *which the Prince in private bestowed upon her.* This must a good man do, who not being able to master the *luxury*, *liberty*, and *perverseness* of the *Prince*, must at least divert them, and bend them other ways, whence there is least danger like to arise, either to the *public*, or the *Prince's* honor.

CHAP. VI.

The Scarcity and Condition of honest Men, in corrupt and vicious Courts. The Swarms of ill Men, and their Arts of ingratiating themselves.

PERHAPS some will say, that it seldom falls out, that a *tyrant* or a dissolute *Prince*, will take into his favor an honest man; I do not deny but it is very rare, but yet I must affirm there are few *Princes' Courts* in which there are not some

good men found; if not called thither by the *Prince*, at least drawn thither by their own desire of doing good to others, and infringing the power of evil men: who stand their ground there to that end, through the assistance of the best disposed *Courtiers*, and through the friendship and patronage of some great man, observing carefully that wholesome rule of *Lepidus*, whom *Tacitus* (Annal. 4.) brings for an example of a good and wise *Courtier*, who neither with an unseasonable contumacy exasperated the *Prince*, nor with a sordid flattery soothed him in his vices. The same *Tacitus* for these reasons commends *Capito* and *Labeo*. *That age* (says he) *had at once two ornaments of peace; but Labeo was of a more uncorrupt liberty, and therefore more esteemed, whilst Capito's pleasing humor was more acceptable to the great ones.*

I do not deny, but a *Courtiers'* life will be far more difficult to an honest man than to another; but withal I must affirm, that the advantage of *glory* and content of *mind* that will arise from thence, will much recompense the trou-

ble of it; since, if he carry himself wisely, and accomodate himself to those things that he sees he cannot change nor overcome; I dare say, he will at last become acceptable to the worst of *Princes*, and dearer than others of a worse repute, who seldom manage the *Prince's* business with a due fidelity and care, or at least not equal to that he might easily promise himself from the hands of a virtuous and honest man. And hither tends the counsel of *Sallust* and *Mecænas*, whereby the first recommended to *Julius Cæsar*, and the latter to *Augustus*, the choice and friendship of good men; because conscience and care of their reputation restrains these more powerfully from dishonest things, than the fear of punishment or the want of power does others.

But as I said, the vicious are always in *Court* in greater throngs, who chiefly by two ways ingratiate themselves with the *Prince*; first, by flattering and fulfilling whatever he shall please to command; and that the more servilely, as their hopes of gain are greater. Next, that *Princes* are pleased to have those about them, in

comparison of whom, themselves, though bad, God knows, seem to be good. Some there are who think also their lives more secure in the company of those who are most like themselves. *Dionysius* the Tyrant being requested to expel out of his *Court* one who for his villainy was hated by all men, answered, *No, he would keep him, lest he himself should become the most hateful person in the Court.* It is natural to those who find themselves obnoxious to any *vice*, by comparing themselves to those that are worse, to seek to purchase themselves some shew of probity; and it has been an old trick of *Princes* to choose unlikely *successors*, to the end their own acts and virtues might appear better and more illustrious: for *Tacitus* is of opinion, that for no other reason did *Augustus* adopt *Tiberius*, whose arrogance and cruelty he knew full well; nor *Tiberius* chose *Caligula*.

It is principally necessary, that a good man be very sober and circumspect in his discourse; for *Princes* seldom or never love an unwary and careless liberty in any kind of men, how virtuous soever

they be. Neither did *Plato's* freedom with *Dionysius* succeed well; which was the reason of his being delivered to needy mariner, and sent to be sold in the isle of *Crete;* whence being redeemed by certain philosophers, he was admonished *either to abstain wholly from the conversation of Princes, or to speak plausible things.* With the like advice did *Aristotle* furnish his cousin *Callisthenes,* then going to attend upon *Alexander,* to wit, *That he should very seldom speak, and then never but pleasing things, to him upon whose tongue's-end lay the disposal of his life.*

CHAP. VII.

Whom, when, and how we ought to flatter; the Nature of a free and tolerable Flattery, and the necessity of it in Court.

THOUGH it be inconsistent with the strictest rules of morality and virtue, yet if you live in *Court,* you must some-

times so flatter the *Prince* as may gain him to you. But all flattery is not tolerable; a base and servile one was displeasing even to *Tiberius* himself, of whom it is written by *Tacitus*, (Annal. 3.) that going out of the Senate, he was once heard to say of those flattering Senators in Greek, *O men born to slavery!* There are circumstances wherein flattery used is as prejudicial as when wholly omitted; for it happens often, that he whom we flatter too grossly, suspects deceit. It is requisite still that flattery have something of truth, and some shew of liberty mixed with it, (it is the opinion of *Æschines* and *Plutarch*,) whereby we may persuade not only the *Prince*, that we speak heartily, and as we think, but others also, and so preserve our credit.

Cræsus, who whilst he was a king himself, had learned well the humor of kings, and what would either please or displease them, when *Cambyses*, king of the *Persians*, demanded of those about him, what they thought of him in comparison of his father *Cyrus*, they all affirmed that he was greater than *Cyrus*,

as he had added to his father's kingdoms *Egypt*, and the dominion of the sea. When *Cræsus* (then a captive) came to speak, he affirmed, that he was much inferior to his father, because he had as yet begotten none equal to himself. This answer had some taste of freedom, and therefore was more pleasing to *Cambyses'* vanity, than all the rest had said.

That flattery is very notable of *Valerius Messala*, recorded by *Tacitus* (Annal. 1.) "*Messala Valerius* added, That it was "convenient the oath of allegiance "should every year be renewed in *Ti-* "*berius's* name; who being demanded by "*Tiberius*, whether he had any com- "mandment from him to give that ad- "vice, answered, that he spoke it of his "own accord; and that in what con- "cerned the Common-wealth, he would "use no man's advice but his own, what- "ever the offence or danger were; which "was a wonderful unpractised kind of "flattery."

Like this, is that which the same *Author* relates of *Ateius Capito*, (Annal. 3.) "*Lucius Ennius*, a gentleman of *Rome*,

" was accused of treason for melting the
" Image of the Prince, and making it
" into Plate; *Cæsar* commanded he
" should not be prosecuted for it: *Ateius*
" *Capito* openly complained with a seem-
" ing liberty, that the power of deter-
" mining in such a case ought not to be
" taken from the Senate, nor so great a
" crime pass unpunished; and that he
" was slow in resenting his own, lest he
" should also punish an injury done to
" the Common-wealth." It were easy to bring more examples of this kind, but these are sufficient to instruct those on whom there is imposed a necessity of flattering, that they may take heed lest their flattery bring upon themselves, or others, any private or public damage; it is sufficient that it be such as may sometimes satisfy thy *Prince's* vanity.

CHAP. VIII.

How to manage the Counsels of a Prince.

A *Courtier* ought to beware how he engages himself (though called) in the counsel of a proud and violent *Prince*; for such as those ask counsel for no other reason than as *Xerxes* did when he went to invade *Greece*: he called together the *Princes* of *Asia*, as it were to deliberate with them about the conduct of the war; but they being come before him, he said, lest I should seem, without your advice, to act all things according to my own will, I have called you, my Lords, to counsel: yet I would have you know, that I expect from you obedient minds, and not troublesome debates. *Cambyses*, the predecessor of *Xerxes* being about to marry his sister, demanded of his counsellors, whether any law of the *Persians* prohibited such a marriage; they perceiving the king did not ask this question so much to resolve himself of any doubt,

as to sound the dispositions of the *Nobles*, answered, that truly there was no law that warranted expressly this that the king was about to do, but there was one that affirmed, that whatever the king thought fit to do, was lawful. Thus, out of the humor of the *Prince*, and the nature of the affair, we must first make a judgment, whether it be fit, or safe, when he asks our counsel, to deliver freely our opinions, or to humor him in his inclinations.

You have *royal* examples of this already; I will now bring one of a man, who, though he was not a king, yet bore the office of a king, not above an age ago in *Spain*; *Ferdinand* being dead, the *Pope* and *Maximilian* the *Emperor* exhorted *Charles* of *Austria* (then in *Flanders*) to take upon him the title of King of *Spain*: although his mother *Joan*, *Ferdinand's* daughter, was still living, but wholly unfit for government, by reason of her want of health. The States were hereupon assembled, and before them Cardinal *Ximenes*, to excuse the novelty of the thing, discoursed excellently of

the reasons of what was done. The *Grandees*, more observant of ancient customs and the *Queen*, than was fit against a *King* that was shortly to succeed of course, protested very obstinately against it; *Ximenes* being angry, rose up and told them "the thing that was treated "of, was not to be called in question; "neither was there any need of their "advice in the case: that kings being "about to enter upon their kingdoms, "are not to expect the consent of their "subjects; that they who were assem-"bled, were not called out of any neces-"sity, but that they might have occasion, "by the promptitude of their suffrages, "to endear their Prince to them. But "since they interpreted that as a due, "which was only a favor, they should "see that without their approbation he "would proclaim King *Charles* at *Ma-*"*drid*;" which example all the rest of the cities quickly followed.

Such a manner of proceeding, not only in these cases, but in all others in a manner do *Princes* use; scarce asking any man's advice, but either to the end they

may countenance their own resolutions with the consent of many, or else to discover the disposition of the person they advise withal, as *Tacitus* witnesses that *Tiberius* oft did. The *Courtier* must therefore solicitously sift into the *Prince's* mind, lest he shonld chance to give offensive counsel. If the *Prince's* inclination in the thing debated be doubtful to him, let him seem to discuss the matter, and so laying down arguments both for the one, and the other side, let him leave the *Prince* to his own election; who (if the thing advised of, be not unalterably resolved upon already) having heard the reasons that may be brought against it, if he be discreet, will change his mind.

Neither in this case will there be any ground for that bashfulness (of blushing, to seem so much inferior to any body, as to follow their counsel) which, though it be very hurtful and unbecoming to them, is very familiar amongst great men; for having said what you can, you leave the freedom of determining all to the *Prince's* prudence, whereby you will also avoid the danger that many times coun-

sellors are obnoxious to, if their advices succeed ill. And if the *Prince* following his first resolutions meet not with success, he will by so much the more acknowledge and esteem the prudence of that *Courtier* who foresaw the approaching misfortune, when it was yet avoidable.

If you be pressed to deliver your opinion in an unlawful matter, either seek some pretence of delay, or else intreat that some third person may be called for the better discussing of the business; whereby the case being more maturely weighed, it may appear what is most for the dignity and safety of the *Prince*. By this means *Burrhus* defeated *Nero's* first attempt against his Mother's life; "Promising that himself would kill her if she "were found guilty; but since it was afforded to every other person, a trial "could not be denied unto his mother." Whilst the examinations are taking, *Nero's* fury assuages, and his fears grow less, so that his determination, though it were not quite altered, yet it was laid aside to another time.

But this manner of proceeding takes

not place upon all occasions, being proper only in desperate and ambiguous cases. Moreover, before we adventure upon it, we ought to know, whether the nature of the *Prince* is compatible with delays: for there are some so headlong and impatient, that there is no means more certain of incurring their displeasure, than by using delays.

CHAP. IX.

The sudden Resolutions of Princes, how to be moderated.

When, as it often falls out, our advice is not asked in the resolution, but for the manner of execution of what is resolved on already; if the business seem inconsistent with reason and honesty, we must propose the remotest means we can think of for the effecting it; and countenance our advice with the pretences of facility, equity, and security; shewing withal, that sudden undertakings, are full of hazard, and difficulty. When we

have to do with impatient *Princes*, we ought to be ready, and have always our wits about us for these sudden occasions; and then if they be not unsufferably rash and wilful, no doubt but they will follow that course which we shall demonstrate to be most safe and easy: yet if their madness be such, that they will not hear mild and gentle counsels, his adviser may yet excuse his wary prudence with a care and affection to the *Prince*; desiring rather, that things should be done slowly with security, than rashly with the ruin of his master.

Now if in that headlong course that the *Prince* hath wilfully chosen, difficulties or straits occur, he will much more reflect upon the prudence of him that would have dissuaded him in time, and perhaps for the future be willing to hearken to him, propounding milder ways. Besides this gaining time doth frequently afford subject of moderating the *Princes* passion, and of bridling his desires, or else of letting him see, that what he is about is either wholly impossible, or else cannot be effected without great absurdity.

For it often happens, that the ways which *Princes* propose to themselves, are accompanied with such circumstances of difficulty, as are not to be overcome; and to these kind of straits, as I would not have you exhort him, so I would not have you too much dissuade him from them, (rather suffer him with a respective silence to take his own course, least you dissuading out of these difficult ways, he seek out some easier one of compassing his will;) which otherwise having toiled himself out of breath amongst the obstacles that he met with, he would voluntarily give the business over. But sometimes it falls out that *Princes* commit the execution of some wickedness or injustice to an honest man; in which case truly (although all good men ought to suffer any violence or misfortune rather than consent to be made the minister of villainy) I fear the number of these is very few that are so generously resolved, as by a passive disobedience to expose themselves to the sacrifice for another; especially if the occasion offered, and the nature of the

Prince admits of no denial, or excuse, nor affords any way of casting that displeasing employment upon some third person.

Which latter course *Burrhus* took, *Nero* resolving the second time upon his mother's murder, full of so much the more care and eagerness, by how much the danger of her contrived shipwreck in the *Tiber* had produced no other effect, than that the woman, always before malicious and greedy of revenge, was, after so great an injury, become more enraged than ever. *Burrhus* and *Seneca*, being called to counsel, stood long ambiguous and doubtful what to say, as *Tacitus* reports *Annal.* 14. saying: "They "were both of them a long time silent, "fearing lest they dissuade in vain; at "last *Seneca*, hitherto the more forward "man, cast his eye upon *Burrhus* as if he "would have asked, whether the execu- "tion of that *murder* should not be left "to the *soldiers*; *Burrhus* prevented "him with an answer, and says, that the "*Pretorian bands were* all devoted to "*Cæsar's* house, and so mindful of *Ger-*

" *manicus*, that they would act nothing of
" cruelty against his progeny; and there-
" fore that *Anicetus* should perform his
" promise. So he freed both himself and
" his soldiers, from the execution of that
" wicked act."

I confess, he is not beholding to you, who, to keep yourself innocent, shall intangle in such an employment: but should such an occasion happen, I think it fitter that some such man as *Anicetus* was, should undergo the infamy of such an act, than any virtuous or honest man.

Yet the safest way of all is in time to forsee, and in their birth to prevent, and occur to the unjust desires, and the unlawful designs of the *Prince;* and before they either take root, or appear above ground, to suppress and pull them up. There are many, who with seasonable and gentle admonitions, and *silken* words, as *parasites* call them, have done much good, and had wonderful success in these cases; yet it is necessary, that whosoever would use such remedies as these, be of great authority with the *Prince*, who must hear as much out of reverence

as love; and nevertheless, when all is done, though it may succeed well in this or that case, it will hardly do so in all. I am much pleased with the way of those men, who are of a conceited and pleasant humor, and for that faculty, acceptable with the *Prince:* who, as it were, intending something else, with a fit similitude, or a well chosen story, will represent to the *Prince* the danger, and foulness of those counsels, wherewith he seems to be carried headlong away.

But to do this, there is a great nimbleness of wit, and pleasantness of discourse required; besides, they must take heed the *Prince* smell not out, that himself is the argument of the jest. As *Tiberius*, who in the tragedy of *Atreus*, composed by *Scaurus*, believed he was reproached of his brother's murder; and *Domitian*, in that which *Helvidius* wrote of *Paris* and *Cenon*, thought himself upbraided with his divorces: wherefore it is necessary, that these kind of stories be skilfully interwoven amongst other things not squaring or applicable to the *Prince;* and it is very pertinent to this purpose,

that they take care not to inculcate too plainly, that matter which makes most to the purpose; though, lest it should quite escape the *Prince's* observation, it may be, as it were, by a casual repetition iterated. The conceit and continuance of the story, by how much the greater, and more cheerful it is, by so much the more it will imprint those things that are said; and because they seem to come by chance, not of purpose, or design, they will not distaste the ticklish ear of the *Prince*.

For this kind of moderation, whereby you may neither contribute to the *Prince's* vices, nor in vain resist them; there are many critical times, and means which those who attend upon the persons, and are employed in the affairs of *Princes*, cannot but meet with. If the case be such, that you must needs contradict the disposition and inclination of the *Prince* you must seek some other passion or humor in him, whereunto he is equally inclined, and so beget a strife and contention in the *Prince's* mind; but we must carefully pretend still, that what

we say comes from the duty and reverence that we bear him. By this means did *Mutianus* keep *Domitian* in order, and hinder him from joining with *Cerealis* as (out of what hopes I know not) he was about to do, says *Tacitus, Hist.* 4.

CHAP. X.

The several Natures, and Tempers of Princes, how to be handled: with the Art of Courtiers in introducing their Companions.

YET to do these things successfully, it doth much conduce, that we know the inclinations of our *Princes*, which depend upon the natural temperature of their bodies. The difference and variety of which, is common to them with other men; except, that as they are more powerful than others, so they are less masters of their affections and inclinations; which are for the most part, more violent and more unreasonable in them than in meaner persons.

He in whom *choler* rules, is hasty,

proud, and prone to anger; a lover of ceremony, and respect; a sore enemy to those who are in the least refractory; impatient in execution, and rash in resolution; a contemner of all men's opinions, that differ from his own; very apt to commit injuries, yet soon friends with those he has wronged, if they renew not the memory of past enemies; but a hater of those that rip up old offences, and that he may prevent such as he is afraid of, watching all occasions of doing them a greater mischief.

Whoever has to do with such a *Prince* must always have his eyes and ears open that he may readily understand and obey the first beck, without making any reply or delay, least by contradiction the *Prince* suspect him of arrogance, as one that would seem to think himself wiser than he; let him not stick to submit himself to the lowest kind of employments, if need be, though they suit not with his condition. He must be patient of injuries, and no ways mindful of them, but after a wrong so much the more officious: he must not brag of his merits

lest he should seem to reproach the *Prince* with them; but rather heap services upon services, lest the memory of those that are past should wear out, and to the end, the pleasure and gracefulness of fresh ones may revive the remembrance of the old. When the *Prince* is angry, let him not come near him, for all things displease him then; neither are those who are dearest to him, grateful in any thing they can devise to say or do. Familiarity with such humors as these, turns into contempt; which for *that* reason, although the *Prince* invite us to it, is to be avoided; let all things rather tend to modesty and respect. For these lions, though sometimes meek and gentle, are at other times enraged against those they love best, and who are in most authority with them.

They that are of a sanguine constitution, are for the most part of a pleasant humor, lovers of mirth, and recreation; flying sadness, the seriousness of business and trouble of debates, lovers of peace, leaving the administration of their affairs to others, in whom they suffer nothing

more unwillingly than complaints. They are courteous, gentle, and free, if not from all, at least, from any grievous injuries; more mindful of benefits received from others, than done to themselves; complacent, willing to help, and for the most part liberal.

He that lives with such as these, must omit no circumstances of veneration and respect, but very seldom must they treat of business, or serious affairs. Those that are employed in the greatest, and most important offices, and concernments of the kingdom, ought not to come near these *Princes*, before they are either called, or certain that the *Prince* is not engaged in any recreation; lest otherwise, they should interrupt him in his greatest delights, and make him blush to be surprised by those, who, he may apprehend, are secretly angry, to see him no better entertained. For so when *Philip* of *Macedon* was once at play, it was told him, that *Antipater* was at the door, who, presently troubled, and conscious of his transgression, hid his dice under his pillow: blushing, that *Antipater* should

catch him at that sport. Therefore with such a *Prince*, those who manage the greatest affairs of the kingdom, in serious and weighty trusts exceed others: so also are they out-gone by others, in a familiar and free access to the *Prince's* person; who naturally avoids these kind of serious men, as much as may be. Those men who are of a jovial and well tempered disposition, and capable as well of pleasure, as of business, are chiefly acceptable to these kind of *Princes*. Provided, that whilst they are out of the *Prince's* sight, they do not with too much facility and complacency lose their authority with others; but they must preserve the honour of their rank entire, for without that (as the Proverb says) familiarity breeds *contempt*, and contempt gives encouragement to quarrels upon the first appearance of an injury which the *Prince*, being an enemy to trouble and strife, to free himself of, will endeavour to remove him that shall appear most faulty.

A melancholy *Prince* is slow in his counsels, anxious, thoughtful, diffident,

jealous, witty, and for the most part peevish, given to silence, and when he speaks, involving himself in ambiguous words, a dissembler, apt rather to sound other men's opinions, than deliver his own; an enemy of jests and freedom, a lover of solitude, difficult of access, a friend to few, and to those but coldly; prone to hatred, out of diffidence, an inseparable companion to him; covetous and fearful, even to absurdity; one that hates equally those whom he hath offended, with those who have offended him; implacably greedy of revenge, and whom, though reconciled to you, you ought to be jealous of.

With these kind of dispositions, we cannot deal with too much wariness and circumspection; principally we must take care of our tongues, and call, as it were, a council upon every thing we say; that we may speak nothing strange or offensive, nor indeed, scarce at all, unless we be called upon: in our respect, we must rather exceed, than fall short, and altogether abstain from contradiction, without pressing him, when he demurs in his

counsels, least his melancholy once kindled into choler, never quench till it convert to hatred. In our demands, we must not be importunate, when we see him deny us readily; for it is not convenient to accustom the *Prince* to give us repulses, especially such a *Prince*, who being by his nature prone to ill suspicions will think that man his enemy to whom he hath given a refusal; neither will you easily afterward, by any skill, take this apprehension from him; for with such, the memory of an injury endures long; and measuring others by themelves, they believe all men as malicious and as obstinate in their hatred as they. In short, these kind of men are the worst, and most difficult of all others; and whose temper, by reason of the variety of cloudy thoughts, that hover in their dark imaginations is most unequal; which makes their conversation exceeding troublesome.

The phlegmatic *Prince* participates of the heaviness and slowness of the melancholy; but as in understanding, so in peevishness and distrust, is inferior to him; for his heart is as it were, con-

gealed with cold; and hence it comes to pass, that he is diffident of none so much, as of himself; fearing to undertake great matters, because he despairs of success, and knows not how to go about it. He is doubtful in his counsels, fearful in execution, not of a quick capacity: and as his hate is not great, so his love is not vehement.

To supply the heaviness of these *Princes*, an active and ready Minister is necessary. When the *Prince* hath once found him capable to effect those things, that himself thought desperate, discovering the weakness of his own wit; he loves, admires, and cherishes this man, as necessary to him. And that kind of favor, which leans upon the opinion of such a necessity, is of all others most durable. Which our courtier once observing, let him make it his business to bring to a prosperous issue, those businesses that seemed most difficult, and from which the *Prince* expects little or no success; as it was the constant practice of that great Minister of France, Cardinal *Richelieu*, who always kept the King entangled

in such dangerous undertakings, that if he would, he knew not how to be without him.

Let our Courtiers also, if it can be so contrived, compass these things, and execute the most material part of his business himself alone, taking heed, however he do, that he take not to his assistance, a helper or companion, more habile and dexterous, than himself: Withal, let him beware he be not too long absent from court, least he chance to lose the *Prince*; who if he shall once find one more able or useful than him, he will be either less valued, or at least be held less necessary; and so being laid aside once or twice, in employments that shall succeed in other hands, will at last fall into contempt.

Wherefore it is an old art of Courtiers, not to take unto themselves any *Companions*, but such as in virtue and prudence they shall much excel, to the end, that in comparison of these, their own lustre may so much the more appear, and that the *Prince* being surrounded with such as these, may not easily know where to

find one, whom he may either prefer or oppose unto the introducer of these. Moreover, these grosser souls, as often as he hath need of them, to whom they do now their present, and may owe their future advancement, are easy and obnoxious to be debauched by him, and ready for corruption, which he cannot easily expect from one that is his equal in condition, or in parts, and who stands upon his own legs. These are the several kinds of human inclinations, whereunto *Princes* are no less subject than other men, inclining now to this, and then to that side, according to the prevalence of this or that temperature in them.

CHAP. XI.

That Age, Business, Custom, and Sickness alter the Temper of the Bodies, and Constitution of the Minds of Princes.

NOTWITHSTANDING that for the most part things are thus, yet these rules are not infallible, and without exception; for

age, custom, and business, alters the temper of the bodies, yea, and the inclinations and actions of *Princes*. In the time of war, the *Prince* cherishes military men, but peace being returned into his kingdom, the authority and interest of these men doth soon wax old; and then, if the *Prince* inclines to pleasure, or any other affection, he will be apt to save those that can serve or further him in it.

See what *Tacitus writes* of *Tiberius*, Annal. 6. "He changed his manner, "strangely with the times; whilst he was "a private man, and under *Augustus's* "government, both his life and manners "were of good repute; as long as *Germanicus* and *Drusus* lived, he was close "and crafty in counterfeiting virtue; as "long as his mother was alive, he kept "a mean betwixt virtue and vice, for "cruelty he was infamous, but for his "lusts as long as he either loved or feared "*Sejanus*, secret. But in the end, he "burst out into all wickedness and "dishonesty, and casting away both fear "and shame, he suffered himself to be "carried wholly by his vicious inclina-"tions."

Of *Caligula*, this judgment of *Passienus* is very notable; there was never a better servant, nor a worse master. It is almost incredible, what variety of dispositions were found in *Marius* and *Sylla*; so that *Plutarch* doubts, whether fortune wrought this change in their natures, or only brought to light what before of wickedness lay concealed in them. In which case, if I should speak my opinion, I would declare, I thought they did not change their natures: but only pull off those masks, that fear and a narrow fortune had muffled them withall. Just as *Leontius* said of *Zeno*, "that a ser-"pent frozen with cold, hurts not; but "warmed by the fire, thursts forth his "sting."

Tryphon, as *Josephus* witnesses, whilst he led a private life, to win upon the people, did personate a good man; but being made a king, he threw off his disguises, and quickly let them see, that all that virtue which appeared in him, was forced and counterfeit; and that of *Agamemnon* is not much unlike, if what *Euripides* writers of him be true; he was

modest, affable, and easy of access before he was chosen Generalissimo of the Greeks; but after that election, he became an enemy to his friends, and inaccessible to all, in keeping himself shut up, whereby he became so distasteful, that the precept the *poet* gives upon this occasion, is worth recording:

These men are wise, that great advancement gain,
And still their ancient modesty retain.

An excellent sentence, but observed by few. *Pollio* truly seemed to follow it, if we may believe *Seneca*. "Afterward, "*(saith he,)* being promoted to the "highest degrees of honour, he never "corrupted by any occasion, deviated a "whit from his former modesty, tem-"perance, and civility: he was never "pufft up with prosperity, nor with the "variety of business was he so disorder-"ed, as that any one could surprise him "in a humor, derogating from the repu-"tation he had gained before."

For truly, the defects and blemishes of *Princes* and Courtiers, proceed for the most part out of pride, the inseparable

handmaid of greatness. This is what makes them despise other men's counsels, being vainly persuaded, that they excel other men, as much in prudence, as they do in power. And some are so carried away with this stream, that they think it below them to keep within the limits of law or reason; believing they cannot be *Princes* to whom all things are not lawful they have a mind to, according to that of the *Poet:*

Virtue, Truth, Faith, such private things as these
Are not for Kings, they must do what they please.

But if these kind of opinions only corrupted the weakest, and worst of *Princes*, I should wonder the less; but I see the minds of the best men are blinded also with the witchcraft of power and rule. No man ever yet exceeded the seven sages of Greece, in giving precepts of modesty; nor ever were there worse tyrants, than such of them as came to government. *Appianus* speaking of *Aristo*, reckoned up not a few who bore the name of *Philosophers*, who played the tyrants at *Athens*; naming also some of

the very *Pythagoreans*, who being called to government in *Italy*, did exceedingly abuse their power; which makes me doubt much, whether most of those *Philosophers*, who so proudly contemn honours and dignity, do it in good earnest, or not rather for a cloak and cover to their small deserts, their poverty, and idleness. Surely, if we will believe *Aristophanes*, they do not live so frugally and nearly, so much out of virtue, as necessity; and would not refuse to feast plentifully, whenever they were invited.

CHAP. XII.

How much Impostors are able to do by flattering Princes; and how a Prince is to beware of them.

THERE are oftimes impostors, who with flatteries, and hidden sly suggestions, creep into the *Prince's* bosom, and corrupt their nature; to these kind of men, *Tacitus* imputes the pride and cruelty of *Vitellius*. *Vespasian*, who was of a gentle

nature, learnt from these people to *oppress* his *subjects* with heavy tributes, as the same *Tacitus* affirms; in short, it is certain, that many who have used the service of these kind of men, have sadly degenerated. These impostors seek favor to themselves, by showing the *Prince* ways to greatness, power, and profit; who so much the more willingly hearkens to them, the less he understands himself. He, poor man, not reflecting, nor observing that these men praise and sooth him, that may at last betray him to contempt, and expose him to the hatred of his people. And truly, to humor and comply with the cruelty, covetousness, and lust of a *Prince*, is of all others, the securest way to betray him; for he cannot condemn the traitor, without discovering his own guilt and vices.

The *Franconians*, by the help of *Ægidius*, at that time governing in Gaul for the *Romans*, had expelled *Clodius Comatus* out of his kingdom, whom one of his friends desiring to see restored, goes over to *Ægidius*, and fostered upon all occasions, as much as in him lay, the avarice and cruelty of the man, which

was but too notorious before; whence the injuries of this Roman growing insufferable, the Franconians begin to wish for their king again, and at last recal him to his kingdom. Thus this honest Franconian made good use of his flattery, and by feeding him in his own vices, betrayed his master's enemies. See what arts *Sejanus*, who gaped after the Roman empire, used, after he saw that *Tiberius*, who by his instinct had imprisoned *Agrippina*, and her children, grew weary of the city; spurred that inclination on, hoping that when the *Prince* once retired, the trust and government of the empire should be cast upon him, as indeed it came to pass; so that for a time *Tiberius* was only lord of a little island, and *Sejanus* Emperor. *Perrennius* also thirsting after the empire, first circumvented and made away all those that stood in his light, under pretencc of a conspiracy that *Lucilla* had contrived against *Commodus*; and then intices the Emperor to pleasures, whereby himself might come to the managing of all things, and at last attain to the Empire.

The same way took *Bardas*, uncle to

Michael, Emperor of *Constantinople*, who having taken away *Theoctistus*, his associate, and tutor to the young *Prince*, contrived also his mother's banishment; persuading *Michael* to take the government into his own hands; whose young years incapable of rule, he soon diverted to delights and pleasure; so that he gave himself wholly to these entertainments, and intended nothing else: *Bardas*, in the mean time, fishes eagerly after the love of the people, and to that end converses, with *good* and *learned men*, restored learning in the city, and made many good laws: by which means, he would, doubtless, have stept at last into the imperial throne, if another had not prevented him. I do not bring these examples, that I may teach how *Princes* are to be circumvented, but that I would have *Princes* themselves learn hence, what prudence and caution is necessary for them to discern, and distinguish the counsels of their *Ministers;* and chiefly that they may beware of those who are apt to sooth them in, and applaud, their lusts and vices: and learn

to think well of such, as will sometimes modestly adventure to express their dislikes of their excesses.

CHAP. XIII.

Of the Familiars and Servants of the Prince, and the ways to win them.

HAVING considered all things, that our Courtiers were to observe in the *Prince* himself, let us come to his servants, who by reason of the offices they bear, are continually about his person, and may be useful to those who pretend at court, either by procuring them extraordinary accesses, or by making seasonable mention of them, or by instructing them of the ways, times, and occasions of doing their business. There are many *Princes* who being private, put on quite another face, than that they bear in public: and who more willingly trust and disclose their thoughts, to such of their servants, as they think faithful to them, esteeming the lowness of their condition incapable

of treachery, or wicked practices; who does not know, that *Claudius* was governed by his freedmen, one of which, called *Pallas*, he so enriched, that once complaining of poverty to some body, he was advised to get *Pallas* to adopt him for his heir. By this man's persuasion, *Claudius* married *Agrippina*, after (by the help of *Narcissus*, a freedman also) he had destroyed *Messalina*.

Who can be ignorant, that during the continuance of the Eastern empire, the Eunuchs many times governed all? if that had not been so, it had been impossible for *Arbetio*, the chief ruler of the empire, to have escaped with life, when *Verissimus* accused him. *Borilus* and *Germanus*, two slaves, by the absolute authority they had with *Botoniates*, one of the emperors, made him an enemy to *Isacius*, and *Alexius Comnenis*.

Yet let us suppose, that the *Prince* does not impart his counsels to these men, they are more easily pried into by these, than any others: for *Princes* cannot always wear their masks in private; oftentimes the throng, and a public life, makes him suppress and hide those affec-

tions, *which*, when he is at liberty, and in private break out. Wherefore, I conclude, it is very necessary in courts, to think all kind of men, (even the meanest,) useful to you. And we must believe for certain, that with their authority and fortune, their prudence and discretion will grow up; which *Arrian* demonstrates to *Epictetus* in *Epaphroditus*, and his two slaves; the one of which coming to wait upon the emperor at his stool, and the other to have the charge of his shoes, *Epaphroditus* himself, who had sold them not long before, as useless, sought now their favor, and praised their prudence.

Fortune has seldom been so favorable to any one in court, as not to afford him as many enemies as friends; neither has it ever yet cast any man so low there, as that he was neither able to hurt, nor help another: whence it was, that in the time of *Tiberius*, as *Tacitus* says, it was a great honor to be known to *Sejanus's* door-keepers. It will therefore be a wise man's part, by all becoming ways, to endear the servants of the *Prince*, whatever their condition be.

CHAP. XIV.

Four kinds of noble Courtiers; how to be handled, and made use of; how warily we ought to deal with inconstant Princes.

FROM the *Prince's* servants, we come to the nobles of the court, which are of sundry kinds; there are some illustrious *for* their birth, but destitute of the *Prince's favor*; others in favor with the *Prince*, but not laden with honors; a third sort, who have honors and offices, far exceeding their *interest and favor*; and lastly, *those who flourish both in favor, and great employments*. The friendship of the first of these, will perhaps avail our courtier very little, who are nevertheless to be honored and respected, according to their quality; lest, though they cannot hurt you *themselves*, by their friends and followers, they should do it: for in such *trains of dependants* and followers, great families are often very

powerful, either by reason of old benefits, or reverence to their greatness; or lastly, (since *Princes'* minds are mutable) out of respect to the fortune and favor these great men may yet chance to come into; with this, or the succeeding *Prince*.

Archelaus, king of Cappadocia, to his great disadvantage, neglected to honor and court *Tiberius*, when he came to Rhodes; for *Tiberius* afterwards meditating revenge, but pretending another cause, called him to *Rome*, where he perished miserably: which respect, the historian says, "he omitted not out of pride, "but that he was warned by some of "*Augustus's* favorites, that whilst *Cajus* "*Cæsar* flourished, and was sent into the "East, the friendship of *Tiberius* seemed "unsafe." We must look therefore upon these great men of fortune, though not able to deserve well of us, yet powerful enough to hurt us; and though they be unacceptable and suspected by the *Prince*, we must yet reverence them, to avoid the blame of others, and their enmity.

If it chance, that the *Prince* will op-

pose you to one of these great ones, as it is usual with *Princes* to do; as you must not refuse the task, so you must with great art, dexterity, and choice of occasions, undertake it; taking care that you may both satisfy the *Prince*, and justify your endeavours to other men; it is an enterprise full of danger, but if at the *Prince's* instance, it be taken in hand, it is the way to rise.

Yet after you are once engaged in one of these brigues, there are the choice of two ways to be taken, according to the nature of the *Prince* you act for, the persons *you have* to do with, and the times you are in; some men act all these things in their own name so boldly, and with so high a hand, that all kind of men, except those who are great indeed, strike easily to them, for fear of offending the *Prince*; who approves (as they believe) all these men say or do. There are others yet, that take another course more safe and sweet, by continually waiting upon the *Prince*, their interest, in whom they will make no shew of, but upon the best opportunities; neither will they take any

occasion for these contentions, but such as with great choice they have selected, as both likely to succeed; and having taken effect, to redound much to the advantage of the *Prince* and public.

For you must take great heed you undertake nothing you cannot go through with; for besides that, the common people judge of all things by the event, believing still, that justice and prudence, are on the side that fortune is; by ill successes, you will soon diminish the esteem and favor you have with the *Prince*. For he, to take away the disgrace received, and by reason, that he fears either to be despised of his subjects, or contemned by his enemies, whom he has opposed in vain, will be compelled to remove his favour from, and abandon you.

Beware, that when I speak of your contention with these great persons, that you understand not, that I wish you to intermeddle when you see it cannot be done without tumult, or that you should provoke them with contumelies and reproaches; for that becomes only a base

soul, whose judgment is corrupted by fortune; the end of which kind of men is seldom happy; as is to be observed in *Piso*, whom *Tiberius* sent into Syria, to cross the hopes and designs of *Germanicus*; against whom he carried himself so insolently, that when Prince *Germanicus* was dead, *Cæsar* was compelled to sacrifice and abandon *Piso* to the public hate.

When I advise you to oppose these great men, it is in case only wherein they are to do something that is unjust, or against the public good, or religion, or that is prejudicial to the government of the army, or the treasures of the kingdom; in which occasions, you must so comport yourself with prudence and modesty, that all others who are concerned and all honest men may perceive, that what you do, proceeds not out of any private enmity, but only from your zeal to the public good. If you demand an example to imitate, behold cardinal *Ximenes*, chosen by *Isabella*, queen of Castile, to tug with those grandees, that were not subject to the king's pleasure, as they

are now: of a Franciscan friar, he was first made the queen's confessor, afterwards by the advice of cardinal *Mendoza*, archbishop of Toledo, and inquisitor general of Spain; which offices he bore with great authority, being there during the whole reign of *Isabella* and *Ferdinand*, and was even to the time of *Charles* the Fifth, the sole arbiter and moderator of all affairs; ever contending with the great, but so discretely, that he always held both the *Prince* and people fast to him.

It is reported that he was poisoned, and he himself suspected it, but the fact could never be proved. Wherefore it is better to attribute so late a death as his (for he was very old) to age and nature; and not without reason, since he preserved his fortune and authority (both which he owed principally to his own industry) entire unto his end. *Chico Simoneta* had not so good success, who whilst *Francis Sforza* ruled in Milan, was called to the helm of business, and afterwards chosen by young *Galeacius'* mother, by reason of his known fidelity,

and experience in public affairs, to contend with his Master's brethren. He to preserve the dukedom for *Galeacius*, banished *Galeacius'* brothers, and *Robert de St Severin* out of *M*ilan, with much envy; yet see how wickedly he was afterwards deserted; for the widow, *Galeacius's* mother, reconciling herself with her adversaries, sacrificed *Simoneta* to their new friendship; by whom being cast into prison, and there flayed alive, he died miserably. Learn hence, how warily we must trust *Princes*, of whose steadiness we are not assured; for often upon a light occasion, they are wont to prostitute their servants to the will of their enemies.

CHAP. XV.

Three other Kinds of noble Courtiers; how they are to be dealt with.

THERE are a second kind of noble Courtiers (as I said before) who are in favor with the *Prince*, and yet not very eminent in any dignity or employment. These, though they can contribute nothing else to us, may make our way to the King seasonable and easy; besides they may be useful in calling to mind our deserts, or if occasion require, in excusing our errors; protecting us also from the calumny and detractions of our enemies; by which means, if they be really our friends, they may serve us highly; as on the contrary side, if they be our foes, they may prejudice us exceedingly: wherefore we must seek the friendship of these *men*, by all means, that are not unworthy our condition; and we must consider, that they seldom stay any long time about a *Prince* unexalted to honor:

nay, suppose that for some reason or other, they be not advanced, yet by their help and commendations, *they* advance their friends, and raise them above others, though either equal or superior to them in desert.

The third sort of nobles, are those who are in great offices of authority, and have a great share in public business, and yet have little interest in the *Princes* favor. And these kind of men are chiefly found about such *Princes* who live quietly, attending to their pleasures, mindless of public business, which they commit wholly to one or two of their tried servants, abhorring the trouble, that is attending it themselves. In such a court as this, we must rather seek the favour of these Ministers, than of the *Prince* himself; who, since he trusts them with the administration of his affairs, leaves also the choice of his officers to these men, being himself unfit to choose men for duties, which he knows nothing what belongs to.

There are other *Princes* more jealous of their majesty, and sparing in their

power; who though they intrust one or two with their affairs, seldom or never admit those men to their presence or conversation, but when they are to treat of weighty business; and do not leave the disposal of places to them, for fear that by the multitude of creatures and dependants, their power should swell to that height, that it cannot be abated, if they transgress. Wary *Princes* are wont to keep their ministers in awe, and make them believe that they can in a moment cast them from all their authority, and divest them of all that power, that with the services and labors of many years, they have been acquiring: towards such persons as these, whose power is thus circumscribed, you will have a hard task to demean yourself. Their friendship can avail you little, nay perhaps if the *Prince* observe it, it will do you hurt. Again, if they stand in *your light*, you will hardly come to the management of affairs, and yet you must of necessity run the hazard of clashing oftentimes with *them*. Wherefore, a most circumspect gentleness of nature will here

be needful: for you must render them all the duties of respect, and as occasion presents itself (yet warily) express the inward devotion of your mind to them: but in the mean while, without openly seeking to, or relying upon the Patronage of any other, you must yourself work out your way to the *Princc's* person, and favour.

There remains now unspoke of only the last kind of Noblemen, who are in short, the favourites, as being both highly in the *Prince's* favor, and great in the administration of affairs: which kind of men, are to be honoured with a respect almost equal to the *Prince* himself. Their wills and inclinations are to be pried into, as being more necessary to be known and executed, than the *Princes* own. Here you see, what you may expect, or hope for, from the authority and patronage of the Peers, and Grandees of the Court; and how you may use each of them in his several degree and kind.

Truly we must carefully take heed, that we ask nothing, of either the *Prince* or

any of all these that is impossible, or cannot be effected without great absurdity; For nothing is more troublesome to human nature, than not to be able to fulfil the requests, of those we love; and surely the friendliest and gentlest dispositions that are, will be offended with an uncivil and unreasonable suit. Know, moreover, that he from whom you have received such a repulse, is not pleased with seeing you again, for fear, with the imprudence of a like request, you should make him ashamed; and also, lest he should seem to want authority or means to perform what you desire. But you must note, by the way, that excess publicly to the great ones, *is not* suddenly obtained, we must by degrees also gain that; and to this end, all that have any interest in them whether they be strangers or domestics, and the dependents of these (according to their usefulness) are to be won to you.

CHAP. XVI.

The meaner Sort of Courtiers, how they are to be handled: as also such as are Enemies to us, for the sake of others to whom we relate.

THERE are yet in Courts below these great ones, others of a lower stage; some of which are our betters, others our equals, and some perhaps our inferiors; all which, since we are to make use of, we will divide into two kinds. The first of those that may help and advantage us, the second of those that are likely, or able to hurt us. The interest and power of bosh of them, is diligently to be weighed, that we may gather what help or impediment we are to expect from them. We must consider also their friendships and alliances, that if necessity press us to seek their votes for the promotion of our designs, if they themselves are through envy or any such respect backward or averse to us, we may work

upon them by their friends and dependants; but we must be sure to take heed that we do not then begin to seek their friendship, when we have apparent need of them, or their assistance; we ought to have it prepared long before, and assured to us by the pledges of a long professed kindness and good will. Let this suffice for the first sort, (to wit, of those that may help us) for every man's industry will prompt him, how to insinuate with such, as he finds may be useful to him.

Of the second sort (to wit) those that may hurt us, there are three kinds; either those who are our enemies, or those who envy us; or lastly, those who are our competitors. Those I call enemies who hate us for our own, *or* our friends sake; but this latter kind of hatred, is not for the most part so inveterate and sharp as the first; and it may be mitigated much by our civilities and professing, "That "we can love our friends, notwithstand-" ing our relation to their enemies." Yet the frieudships of the Court are for the most part factious and cruel; compel-

ing us to break off all friendship and familiarities that may bring us into suspicion. For which reason, many publicly pretending a friendship *to* one, have notwithstanding complied underhand, and kept fair quarter with the adverse party? not out of design to betray their friend, but that if he should chance to fall, they may find a refuge and support. And truly, this care of our preservation may be sometimes blameless, but all kind of treachery is unworthy an honest man.

This kind of prudence has not only been practised in the brigues of the Court, but in kingdoms also, and that very fortunately. *Sycnneses*, President of *Tharsus*, when the war broke out between *Cyrus* and *Artaxerxes*, fearing to resist *Cyrus*, took his part in person, and sent his son to *Artaxerxes*, that if *Cyrus* were vanquished he might be a refuge to his father. *Bardus Durus* escaping out of the hands of the *Saracens*, where he was prisoner, seeing *Phocas* created Emperor against *Basilius*, applied himself to gain the friendship of *Phocas*, hitherto his enemy, and followed him; but caused his son, with a con-

trived flight, to take part with *Basilius*, that if *Phocas* were vanquished, he might intercede for his father, as it afterward fell out. *Solon* made a law, that in case of a civil discord in the Common-wealth none should be permitted to stand neuter; not intending, I believe, that friends taking several sides, should break off their private friendships, but rather hoping that friends being severally engaged, could not but labor for the public peace, so much the more eagerly, and with more success.

After this manner in Court, a man though of a different faction, may yet discreetly, and without prejudice to integrity, retain his friendship with a man of another party; that he may both have a retreat in the change of fortune, and that if their *animosities* should begin to assuage, he may be a fit instrument of reconciliation between the factions: which is the safest and most commendable way amongst the strifes and discords of great men; and the means of gaining at last the favor of both the contending parties.

CHAP. XVII.

How we are to treat with those Enemies who hate us for our own sakes; also concerning Threats and Injuries.

THOSE who hate us for our own sakes, do so either because we have offended *them*, or else (as it is frequent from great men towards their inferiours) because they have injured us; and the *Italian* Proverb says, He that offends, never forgives. It is a custom amongst minds puffed up with a prosperous fortune, to hate those themselves have *wronged*. The injuries that these kind of men do us, are best remedied in our seeming not to understand them: but if it chance, that the greatness of the wrong, wrests out of us some testimony of our sense of the injury received, we must quickly after our grief is over, seem to have lost the memory of all; otherwise, if they see us still impatiently suffer it, fearing our revenge, they will seek to prevent us with a greater mischief.

Chiefly we must beware of threats, if we be not ready, and sure to execute them; for threats, both warn our adversary to beware, and provoke his hatred to double our injuries; affording us nothing but shame, in seeming to breathe revenge, but to be *destitute* of power. I know this kind of moderation will not be approved by all kind of men, especially such as are greedy after vengeance; who think no injury is to be passed over without resentment, not only by reason of the sweetness that is found in revenge, but also because they say, by suffering one injury you invite another: wherefore we must persecute those who offend us with an immortal hate: but these *men* whilst they desire to render themselves formidable, effect nothing else, but make all men fly their Company. For since we mortals are Creatures prone to falls, and slips, and are carried away sometimes with affection, and at other times with passion; and in consideration, every one, for fear of offending, will fly from these kind of malignant, rash, and revengeful persons; and as wild beasts, leave them to their own solitude. Since,

if any one offends one of them, he must expect all that rage and malice can afford at his hands; lastly, if any one provoke one of the malicious Hot-spurs, he, expecting a severe resentment, and fearing a home revenge, will strive to be aforehand with him.

For this reason therefore, to avoid all these evils, I think the contrary way is to be chosen, and gentleness to be preferred; which truly, in the greatest injuries is not hard to be personated, when we consider the reasons and consequences of a passionate resentment, and the condition of the persons from whom we receive them. In lighter *injuries*, that we see arise rather out of passion, than malice or design, we ought to be so *little* offended with them, that it may not be perceived we are sensible of them. If the injury is great and foul we must not appear wholly careless of our esteem and reputation; yet without seeming too implacable towards them who provoked us, as they may have reason to think there is no hope of a reconcilement, or place for pardon on any reasonable satisfaction

left them. And therefore it will be pertinent in this case to complain to his friends who has injured us, of our wrongs, and to make them judge of our difference.

Injuries that are offered in a petulant insulting humor, I think ought to be presently vindicated, not so much out of a desire of revenge, as for the chastisement of him who did them; and to teach him how to demean himself more modestly hereafter, as well towards others, as ourselves. But these injuries also are not to be prosecuted with an inveterate hatred, nay, we ought to declare, that the necessity of complaint, and seeking revenge is put upon us, and that we are ready to be friends after a satisfaction given us, that is any way compatable with the injury we received. And if they give any secret testimonies of regret, or seek in the least manner to us, we must return into favor with them, and by way of amends, let this suffice instead of a submission, that they profess they cannot want your friendship.

CHAP. XVIII.

The Injuries of the more and less Powerful, how to be avoided, and handled; the several Artifices of Reconciliation.

BECAUSE these kinds of injuries are done, for the most part, by those who are much more powerful than ourselves, and who have some way or other, great advantage of us: the first way to avoid them, is to treat these kind of men respectively, and to avoid all freedoms as much as may be with them: or if they be very cross and unruly, to flie their conversations altogether. This saying of *Martial* is in this case very notable:

Wouldst thou avoid what may displease?
Or seek'st thou for content and ease?
With no man be thou over free;
As joys, so griefs will fewer be.

The second way will be, as I said more than once before, not to seem sensible of the wrong; for it is neither safe nor pru-

dent for us, to strive too much with one who is too powerful for us; and the inequality of our forces will be a just pretence to excuse our dissimulation. I know there are some who are persuaded, that if we can but fright our adversaries, they would soon seek us, and desire to be reconciled; and I do not deny, that there are some sly *dispositions* that will descend to do so; but believe me, it is always a dangerous, unsound, and faint reconciliation: and these will seldom or never omit (if any occasion of injury present itself) to give way to their disposition: which is the more revengeful, by how much their dissembling was the tamer; besides a private enemy is harder to be taken heed of, than one who is *publicly* so. It is better to have such as these our professed enemies, than out of fear, our reconciled friends; yet I mean those who are not greater than ourselves, nor whose friendship being lost can hurt us notably.

For if we have to do with one who is much superior to us, and whose enmities will stand in our light, it is better to have

a fained friendship, than open enmity with him; though he offer us the wrong, yet we must endeavor by the mediation of friends to appease him, as if we had done the injury. To discern who is most able and likely to prejudice us, we must consider not only their power, but also the nature of their malice towards us; for some have a desire of reveuge, like a handmaid, always waiting upon their hate; others a fear, lest having gotten what we aspire to, we should be more able to hurt them. Though the sting of this revenge is very sharp, yet the fear I mentioned, is the most violent and frequent cause of our court oppressions, and far the most unavoidable. The first may be mitigated with the satisfaction of a continued duty and respect; but you can seldom persuade fear to put on the confidence of friendship, and good will again; yet we must seek by all means possible to effect it: and occasion will better instruct us how to do it, than any rule can.

Agesilaus desiring to become friends with those whom he had offended, put

them into great offices and employment, which whilst they ill administered, bringing *envy* (as is usual) upon them; being accused, they were compelled to have recourse to the *Prince*; who delivering them from the danger and infamy, won them by the benefit, to be afterwards sincerely and heartily his friends. It is an ordinary thing in courts to supplant one secretly, to the end, that being supported by your favor, he may become your creature. It is no less frequent as *Eutrapelus* craftily practised in *Horace*, to lend those men money to feed their lusts and vanities, whom we desire to ruin. So it proves, that for the most part, those who applaud us in our *pleasures*, our humors, and expenses, and exhort us to undertake things, that are unreasonable, and above our strength, seek our destruction.

But let us now return to the ways of renewing our friendships with our enemies. Amongst all which, it is none of the worst to help both with your counsel and assistance, the desires and endeavors of your enemy, in such things as you see

by succeeding will not hinder, nor prejudice you; that *he may* seem to owe you his love, for your *benefits*. In this manner cardinal *Ascanius Sforza* observing, that in vain he opposed himself to the practises of *Julian* the cardinal, who laboured to advance *John*, the nephew of *Alexander* the sixth, to that dignity, did so eagerly move in the business for *John*, that it succeeding, he got the start of *Julian* in his friendship. If the stubbornness of our enemy be such, that all our endeavors for a reconciliation are fruitless, we must at last look out, if there be any body else that he hates or fears more than he does us, and let us fain this man (if the circumstances will bear it) to be a competitor to us, and him; that his hate towards the other prevailing, may induce him either to favor, or less oppose us in our designs.

An artifice not much unlike this, was that which *Gerlachus*, archbishop and elector of *Mentz*, used, when he intended to create *Adolphus* of *Nassau*, his kinsman, Emperor: he knew that those *Princes* who stood for the Empire, (for which a

governor was now choosing) were divided amongst themselves; which discords and factions, he to make use of, dealt thus with the Electors severally apart. He tells *Wenceslaus*, king of *Bohemia*, that the votes of the Electors, for the most part, would favor *Albert*, duke of *Austria*, *Wenceslaus'* enemy; but if he were certain of *Wenceslaus'* concurrence, he was ready to hinder it. Having thus won *Wenceslaus*, he sets upon the duke of *Saxony*, and tells him, that his enemy, *Brunswick* was like to carry it: and then assures the *Palatine*, that *Wenceslaus* (at that time hated by him) unless prevented, was like to defeat them all. So promising to oppose every man's enemies, he circumvented them all; making by that means, his kinsman Emperor, who, if he had been first propounded, had without doubt been rejected by the common consent of all.

CHAP. XIX.

Of Envy, how it is to be overcome.

Now I must say something of Envy, which is so great an evil, that we have need of a strange felicity, and fortitude to overcome it; which is not to be satiated with any thing, but the participation of that which it envies in another; for every one eager after its own advantage, desires to toil in nothing but that, whence if not the whole, at least a great share of the honor and emolument will redound to himself. Yet although, I confess, it be very hard, yet this envy is nevertheless with industry and prudence to be mastered; and that not only by this means alone, of sharing with them that very thing we seek for: for sometimes it will suffice to persuade those who envy us, that the thing they desire, if it chance to light upon us, will turn much to their honor and profit. To which end, we must court them with friendship and

familiarity; and though their envy to us be very palpable, yet must we express on our parts great inclinations and affections towards them; professing, that we wish nothing more, than that their desires should succeed, and that we desire this very thing that we now pursue, for no other end so much, as that we may become capable to serve our friends, and principally themselves. In short, we must act our part so, as from the augmentation of our fortune, they may conceive hope of advancement to their own.

By those who desire to be free from envy, all pride, over-sumptuous manner of living, unseasonable feasts, *and* boasting, is sedulously to be avoided; especially, by those who have risen from a mean condition, unless the pleasure of the *Prince*, or the dignity of their office, require it otherwise; for then a becoming magnificence, will not be unfit, provided, that in these expenses, he lets the world see, he rather complies with the pleasure of the *Prince*, than follows his own inclination. With this kind of modesty and prudence, the beginnings of

Cardinal *Ximenes* were very fortunate, and notable; for he was born of so mean a parentage, that it was doubtful, whether he were a gentleman or not, although his prosperous fortune found those afterwards, who would undertake to prove his nobility. This *Ximenes* whilst the world went hard with him, became in his youth a friar, whence soon after, for his singular endowments, he was by the commendation of Cardinal *Mendoza*, made confessor to *Isabella*, Queen of Castile, and *not* long after Archbishop of *Toledo*, (as I said once before) which archbishoprick, upon *Mendoza's* death, Queen *Isabella* having obtained of the pope for *Ximenes*; he finding himself too weak for the envy it would draw npon him, refused to accept it; and was so stiff in his refusal, that he scarce suffered himself to be won to the acceptance of it, by all the nobles of the court, who one by one, at the queen's direction, pressed him to embrace it; and having accepted it, he was fain to be entreated over again, before he could be persuaded to live in a condition and splendor equal to his dig-

nity; nay, afterwards he was personally so observant of his former manner of life in this great fortune, *that* no way else, but by the pope's express command, could he be induced to change it.

This modesty succeeded so well with him, that hereby he appeased and avoided that great envy, which must otherwise of necessity have oppressed him, being the possessor of a dignity gaped after by all the grandees of *Spain*, and of revenue scarce inferior to those of the crown.

But yet as this manner of proceeding is, in the cast of our fortunes, an antidote against envy, so it little avails those who have once already carried themselves insolently and proudly; for the moderation of these men is still looked upon as counterfeit: of which thing, the *Constantinopolitan* history affords us an example in a *Metropolitan*, called *Constantine*; who being banished from the courts, both of *Isacius Angelius*, and *Alexius*, the emperors, returned afterwards with the empress *Euphrosiné*; pretending a great aversion from business and a courtier's life, that he might be the more credited,

and sought the more eagerly, he took orders upon him: in short, he carried his business so craftily, that the Emperor himself causing him to be absolved from the oath of Priesthood, called him to Court; and trusted him with the management of his greatest affairs; who presently, not content with his own advancement, introduced his two brothers to wait upon the Emperor; and, as it were, to stand centinels for him, if at any time his business called him away: but because his former prosperity had discovered the insolence of his nature, every body feared him still, although he now made show of great temper and moderation, for which cause he was again supplanted and removed from Court, without ever being restored more.

CHAP. XX.

Of Emulation, the Sister of Envy, and the Remedies of it.

THE same remedies that are good against envy, prevail also against Emulation, which has less malignity in it than envy, but more ambition, and treachery of self-concernments. But these competitors are to be stroked with a certain specious respect, and ceremonious veneration, which will powerfully divert these kind of humors; especially, if we feed their hopes with higher things than *those* we aim at, and seem to contribute our votes and assistance to them; on the one side, vilifying that which we seek for, as below them to stoop to, and fitter for ourselves; whose merits, as they are less so, our pretensions ought not to be so high. If we fear that they will smell our drift, we are to hold them in suspense, and seem to discourse the case with arguments on both sides; yet giving the

greatest weight to those, which we intend should divert their ambitions. But the surest and best course of all, is to conceal, if possible, what we aim after, till it be out of the power of our enemies, or competitors to hinder us.

A too great eagerness in our pretences, is sometimes odious, even to those who would if it were more modest, contribute their assistance to us; pulling with it, besides, other greater inconveniencies upon us, as, if we succeed, more envy, and, if we fail, a greater disgrace: it is much more safe, as I said just now, to hide our designs, and as rowers do, turn our backs upon the place we are going to. Those who look after the greatest commands, have taken this way; nothing has been more usual to them, than after the example of *Agamemnon* in *Euripides* to express a greater desire of rest and retirement, than of honour or employment. And many have found this a singular remedy, to divert the wiles of those who would oppose them, and to escape the disgrace which attends those fierce pretenders; nay, they have had, hereby, the

glory, to have it often thought, that this honour or employment was cast upon them, merely for their merits, and not obtained by begging or buying of voices, as it too often falls out.

Last of all, in our pretences, we must take heed that we clash with no rival, who is greater or more powerful in friends and dependants, than ourselves. in this case we must imitate *Marcus Lepidus*, a man, in *Tacitus's* opinion, of great wisdom; who being drawn, as it were, into the Senate by *Tiberius*, to stand with *Junius Blæsus*, *Sejanus'* uncle, which of them should be chosen procon-sul of *Afric*, pretended presently against himself want of wealth, the tender years of most of his children, and the marriage of a daughter, that he was to take care of: fearing doubtlessly to make *Sejanus* his enemy, if he carried away the pro-vince from *Blæsus*. Neither must we obstinately contend with him, whom some great man is about to advance, al-though the law favor us against him; for without doubt, favor weighs down the law, as *Tacitus* instances in *Germanicus*

and *Drusus*, creating *Haterius Agrippa* Prætor, notwithstanding the express contradiction of a law; but let the historian speak himself. "There arose a dispute "of substituting a Prætor, in the place "of *Vipsanius Gallus* lately dead; *Germanicus* and *Drusus* favored *Haterius* "*Agrippa*, *Germanicus's* kinsman; others, "on the contrary side, contended, that "the number of children should carry "it according to the law. *Tiberius* was "glad to see his sons, and the laws of "the senate, clash together; without "doubt the law was overcome, but yet "not easily, nor by many voices: by "which means, when they were in their "greatest vigour, they were wont to be "overborne."

CHAP. XXI.

How to avoid a threatening Ruin, and when it is upon us, how to make the best Use of it. Examples of the Fall of great Men.

HITHERTO we have observed the principal precepts that are to be observed by our Courtiers; if any want, every rational man's (for such only we intend to instruct) prudence and dexterity will supply it. Now because these kind of rulers are no less necessary, for the preserving our greatness *and* fortune in the Court, than for the gaining it; it will not be impertinent to have the examples of some of those who have fallen from their power and greatness, that, we may grow wise by other men's mischances; and learn, if not to avoid a ruin at least to arm and prepare ourselves for it. For this latter is almost as necessary as the first, since the endeavors of those who seek to escape their

approaching misfortunes, are for the most part vain; whilst he that prepares, himself for it, long before, makes that fall, which few or none of them can avoid; that fortune has lifted up on high to be much more gentle and easy than otherwise.

These falls happen to us, either through our own faults, through the arts and contrivance of our enemies, or through the perverseness of the *Prince's* nature, or perhaps his death. Since the lives of all men are obnoxious to faults, and full of errors, and failings, it is so especially with those who are high, who by reason of their greatness are out of the lists of reprehension; all who are about them, being compelled to approve whatever they do, be it well or ill. Amongst all which faults, the foulest they are incident to is, a *treacherous turning against* their *Prince*, who is the author of their dignity, and power; a crime marked out with the blackest note of an ungrateful and faithless Soul; and a most just subject of the *Prince's* hate and indignation. All men in authority ought

to fly the very *shadow* of this crime, and taking all ground of suspicion from the *Prince*, to decline those honors and places, that are opportune for such attempts.

Paterculus esteems *Sejanus* to have been one of the wisest Courtiers that ever was; and truly it is likely, that he who flourished so long in the favor of a *Prince*, so subtil, and diffident, as *Tiberius* was, comported himself with great modesty and wariness. *He was* (says our Author) *in appearance, given to ease, assuming nothing to himself, and by that means obtaining all things; crouching still willingly beneath the opinion of other men, and striving to come behind them in repute; his countenance and his life, was calm and quiet, although his mind was restless, and ever awake;* yet ambition at last transported this *provident* and wary man so far, as to aspire to the Empire. To which end, *Drusus* being dead, he married *Livia* his widow, that so being linked into the house of the *Cæsars*, he might more easily compass his desire; and although he perceived by *Tiberius'*

tergiversations, when he demanded his consent in the case, that it had drawn a suspicion upon him; yet did he not change his mnid: but what he had failed of this way, he sought to compass another.

He knew that *Tiberius* was grown weary of the city: wereupon he presently spurs him on, and persuades him to retire to *Caprea*; read *Tacitus*, (Annal. 4.) who says, *That lest he should either infringe his power, or weaken his authority, by debarring the multitude from the court, or minister matter of slander, and suspicion by entertaining them, he took this course. He persuaded* Tiberius *to live in some pleasant place, far from* Rome; *foreseeing many conveniencies in it. First, there could be no access to the Prince, but through him; then, that the disposal of all letters would be in his hands, since the soldiers, by whom they were to be conveyed, would be at his devotion; and lastly, that* Cæsar, *now growing old, and waxing effeminate with the privacy of the place, would easily transfer the burthen of*

affairs, and government upon him. And truly, his hopes deceived him not; for in a short time, under pretence of easing *Tiberius's* age, he drew all the power of the empire into his own hands.

Yet at last, the event showed, that this way of *Sejanus* was both perilous and tedious; to mention which more accurately, seems worth my labor here, that Courtiers may be more wary in governing their fortune, and *Princes* more cautious in exalting their *minions*. *Tiberius* either loved or suffered patiently *Sejanus* as long as he found his help useful to the oppression of *Agrippina*, and her children, *Nero* and *Drusus*; to which kind of employments, *Sejanus* shewed himself very ready, knowing that thereby he should not only win the favor of the *Prince*, but also establish his own power and hopes; there being none left of *Cæsar's* house but two youths, whose tender age, if they should come to the government, must needs leave the authority, and ordering of affairs, to him; until he saw his opportunity of usurping the empire itself.

But mark how rash and blind ambition makes us; he did not see that the nearer he came to the top, the more he became suspected of this jealous *Prince;* who now sought all means of lessening, rather than advancing him, who strove as much on the other side to climb still on; for though he wanted nothing but the name of Emperor (which some did not stick to give him) and the Tribune's power (which the *Emperors* never entrusted to any), yet was he not content, but daily endeavoured to augment his authority. By which course, as he rendered himself venerable to all others, so he made himself formidable to *Tiberius;* for when he saw that *Sejanus* had not only won the Pretorian Guards, but also many of the senators, and principal families of *Rome*, by either benefits, hopes or fears, and likewise, that his secrecies were, by his own servants, told to *Sejanus*, and not *Sejanus's* to him again; he determined his destruction, as one who was become his rival; but before he went about it, he thought fit to sound

the inclinations of those about him, that he might know how to chuse some that would like of his design.

Lest *Sejanus* should perceive any change in *Cæsar's* affection towards him, he makes him Consul, and calls him, both present and absent, in his letters to the senate, and the people, his friend, and companion of his labors. Lastly, he feigns himself sick, to discover thereby, the affections both of *Sejanus*, and several others. Sometimes he writes to the senate of his recovering condition, and that he would shortly come to town; sometimes praising, sometimes blaming *Sejanus;* sometimes receiving those who came recommended by him, and refusing others: that thus he might keep him suspended between hope and fear, who whether trusting to his favor with the *Prince*, or for fear of losing of his hopes, resolved to attempt nothing by force; hoping that the disgusts of the *Prince*, if there were any, would wear out with time. In this interim, others who had hitherto fawned upon *Sejanus's* fortune,

not upon himself, seeing *Tiberius* stagger, began to act more warily, and the devotion of many towards *Sejanus* grew cold.

Tiberius having discovered long ago the pride and insolency of *Sejanus*, and fearing withal, lest provoked by contempt he should run some desperate course, caused it to be given out, that he intended to confer the *Tribunical* power upon *Sejanus*; and presently after, commands him to be laid in prison, writing letters to that end to the senate, which were carried by *Macro*, captain of the Guards: who coming to *Rome* first communicated the *Prince's* pleasure to *Memnius Regulus*, then Consul (for the other Consul was more addicted to *Sejanus*), and then to *Græcinus Laco*, captain of the watch, it being not yet break of day. Thence going to the Senate-house, he met *Sejanus*, who startled to see him, demanded if he had brought him any letters from *Tiberius*; he whispered in his ear, that he should anon be saluted *Tribune;* whereupon, he entering the Senate-house, not without an inward joy, *Macro* commanded the Pretorian

guards to go home, showing them a warrant from the Emperor, in which also, he promised them a largess. The Pretorian soldiers being departed, and *Laco's* company placed there in their room, *Macro* enters the Senate, and delivers his letters; immediately he goes forth, without expecting the reading of them, to bid *Laco* stand well upon his guard, lest *Sejanus*, raising a tumult in the Senate, should break away; and went thence himself to the Pretorian guards, to hinder them, lest they should attempt any thing.

The letters that were then reading, were spun out to a great length, that *Macro* might have time enough to order his business; and truly they were interwoven with a wonderful contrivance. In the beginning there was no mention of business nor any thing concerning *Sejanus;* a little after he was touched upon, as they say, with a gentle hand; then some other things interlaced, there followed a more open, but that also a slight accusation against him: at last, after sundry excursions about the affairs

of the commonwealth, two of *Sejanus's* favorites were named, and the Senate commanded to proceed against them: and withal, that *Sejanus* himself should be secured. All mention of his death being purposely left out, that hope might be left of clearing himself of those crimes and those but light ones, that were there objected against him.

The letters being read, many who had waited upon him to the Senate, seeing things of another nature in hand, than that of making *Sejanus* Tribune, rose up and compassed him in, lest he should escape; which it is believed, that he would at least have attempted to do, if in the beginning the *Emperor's* letters had thundered any thing sharply against him. But he then despising those slight touches, sat still in his place; and being called upon, either two or three times, by the consul *Memmius* to rise up, with much ado he obeyed at last, as being accustomed to give, and not receive *commands*. When he was risen, *Laco* followed him close, and after him came *Regulus*, accompanied with other Senators, who led

him from the Senate to the prison; and thence, soon after, to execution at the *Scalæ Gemoniæ*, where he was put to death.

Behold here the ruin of a great Courtier, and a favourite, who for craft and power had scarce ever his equal. The contrivance of whose fall, though it may seem due to *Tiberius's* prudence, yet it is rather to be attributed to his own greatness and prosperity, which ruined itself with its own weight, so evidently, that all those sleights and stratagems of *Tiberius* were not very needful: as may be gathered out of the example of *Perennius*, who aspiring to the same height that *Sejanus* did, and by the same arts, was subverted by *Commodus*, a *prince* of a judgment far inferior to *Tiberius*. It may be, that many will not be moved with these examples, because they seem to be wiser than others, and to know something more than these did, whose misfortunes are here recounted. I will not move them to passion, with telling them what I think; though I will not deny, but in those latter ages, there have

been some, whose projects succeeded less unhappily, as *Boylas*, whose story we read of in the history of *Constantinople*; who being caught in a *conspiracy* against *Constantinus Monomachus*, then Emperor, did not undergo so heavy a punishment, as for such crimes are wont to be inflicted, the reason being, because he had the luck to transgress against a mild and gentle *Prince*.

It will not be amiss to recite the story briefly here, that you may see how the most secret counsels, undiscoverably by the eye of man, are oftentimes discovered by the divine Providence, in an unlooked for *manner*; not being able to escape punishment, by whatsoever *caution* they are *managed*. No mortal man would have believed, that this *Boylas* should have an inclination to, or could have any ground for so great a villainy. The greatness of the favors, which were heaped upon him, had possessed the good *Prince* with a great hope and opinion of his singular fidelity, who seemed also by nature unfit for great undertakings; he was not only of very mean birth, but also staunmered

so much, that he could hardly be understood; which stuttering, since he saw it pleasing to the Emperor, he afterwards affected on purpose; with this assentation and flattery, he so insinuated himself into the *Prince's* familiarity, that the bed-chamber and cabinet of *Constantine*, were always open to him. At last being enriched by the *Prince*, he was chosen into the number of the senators, and began to cast his thoughts higher; wherein he went so far, that he determined by the murder of the *Prince*, to make his own way to the sceptre. This design he first opened to those he knew surely hated the Emperor, promising mountains to such as approved it, and offered him their assistance; and praising greatly those who disliked it, and refused it out of affection and loyalty towards the *Prince;* as whose spy, he would seem to propound such things, to discover the inclinations of his subjects.

By which means, he was undiscovered by all, but such, whose fellowship in the *treason* made him secure of them; and had at last, effected that abominable act, if

at the very time, when he had the weapon in his hand, which he had prepared for the Emperor's throat, one of the conspirators, touched with a sudden remorse of conscience, had not seasonably disclosed, and discreetly prevented it. The Emperor took the injury so patiently, that having condemned some of the conspirators to die, he was satisfied in inflicting banishment only, on the author of the treason.

It were too long to recount all those here, who having undertaken such treasons, were caught in them, or else, though innocent, were believed to be guilty of some such design, and made shipwreck in court. But contenting ourselves with what we have already said, this only is to be added, that all pride, whether through ambition, bragging, reproaches, detraction, ostentation, or other pompous manner of living, it displease the *Prince*, is the high-road to ruin.

CHAXII.

Boasting, Presumption, Arrogance, too much Familiarity, Pride, and Perfidy, noted with Examples.

THIS boasting and recounting of services past, destroyed *Philotas* and *Clytas* in the court of the great *Alexander*; and *Craterus* himself had like to have been overborn with those winds; certainly he had been much more acceptable to the *Prince*, if he had contained himself within the bounds of a generous modesty; so *Caius Silius* with *Tiberius*; *Antonius Primus* with *Vespasian*; and *Sillas* with King *Agrippa*; by boasting of their services, deprived themselves of all the fruit of them: as *Tacitus* witnesses of the two first, Annal. 4. and Hist. 4: and *Josephus* of the last. *Princes* believe their fortunes and favors lost, and cast away upon these braggards, for they will have their subjects seem to owe all they have to them, and their bounty, not to their own virtue and merits

The liberty of reprehending the action of *Princes*, or inveighing against others in their presence is to be carefully avoided, as bordering upon arrogance and presumption. *Eumenes* complaining before *Alexander*, something petulantly, that *Hephæstion* should assign the soldiers quarters to *musicians*, *comedians*, and such kind of people, incurred the displeasure of the king.

To treat with the *Prince* over familiarly, or to seem to make oneself the sole arbiter of his principal cares, savors of pride, although it may proceed only from vanity and covetousness; as it appears in the example of *Zotirus*, once the favourite of *Heliogabalus*; and also of *Turinus*, who scarce worse than *Zotirus*, yet more unhappy, was commanded to be stifled to death with smoke, by *Alexander* the son of *Mammea*; the executioner crying out, *Let him perish with smoke, who sold smoke.* He was wont to brag, that the *Prince* was governed by his advices, and so by intruding upon the *Prince's* retirements, and with impertinent senseless whispers in public, pretend-

ding to favor, was sought by many; and gathered great riches, through the bribes, and presents of those to whom all his interest in the *Prince*, could not avail a straw.

The arrogance of *Plancianus* is also worthy of memory, which being accompanied with great vanity, broke out at last into open perfidy: his arrogance was such, that he did not stick to contend with *Bassianus*, the Emperor's son; who was author both of his dignity, and fortune; and he was withal so vain, that as he passed through the city, he would not only interdict all access to him, but also would not suffer them to behold him, his Ushers going before to clear the streets, of all that they could see. Becoming a traitor at last against his *Prince*, and convicted of treason, he was beheaded. In *France*, during the time of *Philip le Bell*, *Enguerrandus Marigny*, daring to contest personally with *Charles de Valoy*, what misery he brought upon himself, and his friends, may be observed in the French *histories*.

Above all things we must take heed,

that we give not ourselves in court, to sowing of strife between *Princes* and great men: for they becoming friends, do for the most part sacrifice such to their *friendship*; of which, though the stories of all nations are full, yet the *Bavarian* history furnishes us with one example very memorable, of *Otho Crondoferus*, who flourishing with *Rodolphus* the *Palatine* in singular favor, was the author of great enmities between this *Prince*, and his mother, for a time; but the mother afterwards reconciling herself to her son, *Crondoferus* had his eyes and tongue pulled out.

CHAP. XXIII.

How we must not only take care to preserve the Prince's Favor, but also that of those in Power about him.

It is not enough, that the *Princes* themselves be not averse to us, but we must also keep ourselves aright with those who are in favor with them. *Germanicus* at his death, gave that advice to *Agrippina*

his wife, of which *Tacitus*, Annal. 2, speaks thus. "Then turning to his wife, "he entreated her by his memory, and "for their children's sake which were "common to them both, that she would "pull down her stomach, and submit "her great heart to the rage of fortune; "lest returning to the city, she should "with emulation of her greatness, stir up "against her, persons more powerful "than herself." *Agrippina's* neglect of this document, ruined her and her children. I told you before, how much *Eumenes'* favor was diminished *with Alexander*; after railing against *Hephæstion*, he behaved irreverently towards the *Prince*; and discovered his spleen and envy to him whom he accused.

Wherefore, when we see any one in the *Prince's* favor, we must carefully weigh his authority, and compare it, as it were, in a balance against our own; that we may know certainly which weighs down the other; and in the trial of this, we are not so much to observe outward appearances, as the circumstances of inward causes. *Craterus* and *Hephæstion*,

for a time flourished in great and equal favor with *Alexander*; until *Alexander* himself determined the business in calling one of them, the king's friend, and the other *Alexander's*.

Out of which decision, *Craterus* might have made this judgment, that since *Princes*, for the most part, are more in love with their own wills, than their authority; they also are held more dear to them; who rather adore and worship *Alexander*, that is their person, than their fortune and kingly dignity; and though afterward upon a strife that arose between him and *Hephæstion*, when all the court was divided into factions, *Alexander* seemed to incline to neither side, but chiding them both heavily, threatened punishment if ever they should harp upon that string again; yet his manner of dealing with them, shewed rather his singular prudence, to be imitated by all *Princes*, than his equal affection to them both. He apprehended, that this discord might produce great tumults, and mischief; for he knew both *Craterus's* great interest with the *Macedonians*, and how

much *Hephæstion* was envied for his favour to him. Therefore to diminish *Hephæstion's* envy, he reprehended him publicly; and to avoid giving offence to the *Macedonians*, he reproved *Craterus* in private.

Amongst those who in this trial and examen of the *Prince's* favor, between themselves and others, were, out of negligence and discretion, most grossly mistaken; *Antonius Primus* ought to have the first place, who daring to contend with *Mutianus*, learnt at last, that he had better have contested with *Vespasian* himself. And in this manner, you will find it is a thing witnessed by the examples of all courts, to vindicate more sharply an injury against the favorites, than against the *Prince* himself. *Dio* tells us the reason of it, when he had recounted how the same thing happened to *Sejanus*, thus, "As those whom virtue and consciousness of their *own* deserts, has "lifted up to dignities, do not much "stick upon the vain ceremonies, and "outward circumstances of honor; So "on *the* contrary, those who seek to

"climb by ambition, pride, and vice,
" thereby to hide their *unworthiness*, and
" *meanness*, presently take ill, and under-
" stand as a contempt *the least* neglect
" of *ceremony*, and respect *towards them*."
Insomuch, that it is harder to preserve the friendship of these men, than of the *Prince* himself, for he thinks it a glorious and *Princely* act to forgive injuries. When these, lest they should seem to remit that which they cannot revenge, use their borrowed power, in persecuting those who have offended them.

CHAP. XXIV.

Pride even in the meanest Persons at Court, noted with Examples; as also Treachery in betraying the Prince's Secrets.

NEITHER has it been destruction to great one's only, to have carried themselves insolently and amiss, but also to men of the lower stage. *John* King of *Arragon*, loved *Alvarez de Luna* so much, that he trusted him with all his affairs,

and even his kingly power itself, notwithstanding the repining of all his nobles. But when he, by reason of his prosperous fortune, fell into that pride and presumption, that he caused a Nobleman, who, in the king's name, admonished him of his duty, to be precipitated and murdered, he was by the *King's command* beheaded. It is also an ordinary cause of shipwreck in Court, when any one has rendered, either himself, or the *Prince* hateful to the Peers, or People: for, either the *Prince* is fain of his own accord, to cast such a one off, to rid himself of envy, or else others never leave, till they have overthrown him. During the reign of *Commodus*, *Cleander* once armed the Pretorian Guards against the Roman people; which was a ground of so great tumults in *Rome*, that unless the Emperor had sacrificed *Cleander* to the people's fury, he himself could not have been secure.

The same *Commodus*, had rendered himself odious to all men, by his affection to one *Anterus*; from which envy, that they might free their master, some of

Commodus's servants, slew this *Anterus* as he was coming from court. *Eutropius*, who had been long dear to *Arcadius*, the Emperor, since he was believed to be the author of the sedition raised by *Tribygildus*, was given up as a price of the peace, by the *Prince*, to the enemies.

Amongst the evils that subvert Courtiers, there are two remaining, as very dangerous, so very frequent; betraying the *Prince's* secrets, and a conspiracy with his enemies. Crimes for the most part, arising from perfidy, but many times also out of levity, and indiscretion only. And forasmuch as concerns the secrets of *Princes*, I think they do well who pry not into them; and who, if their office exact it not at their *hands*, avoid the bare knowledge of them; for if you be the only person, to whom they are imparted, and Fame (which often makes witty conjectures) chance to scatter any *thing* like them, you cannot avoid the suspicion, that the secret came out by you; and although the *Prince* perhaps imparted it to some one else, yet it may fall out so, that he forgot; or else that

he is more confident of the other man's silence, and so the foil remain upon you still.

Not without cause did *Philippides* the *comic poet*, when he was asked by King *Lysimachus* (to whom he was very dear) of what things he chiefly desired to be made partaker by his *Prince*, answer, that he would refuse nothing that came from the *Prince*, his secrets excepted; from which he desired to be excused; let us from the example of this man, as much as we can, esteem it safer to be ignorant of secrets, so difficult and dangerous to be kept, than to know them. *Hiero*, tyrant of *Syracusa*, was wont to say, that those who discover *Princes'* secrets, wrong both themselves, and those they impart them to, by exposing them also together with themselves, to the hatred of the *Prince*.

CHAP. XXV.

The Causes, Kinds, and Examples of Conspiracies with the Prince's Enemies.

YET their condition is, of all other, most hazardous and ticklish, who led either by avarice, ambition, or desire of providing *for their own security*, *conspire* with the *Prince's* enemies; whether they be either strangers or domestics. Cardinal *Balæus*, a tailor's son, being by *Lewis* the Eleventh, made Treasurer, and afterward a Bishop, at last also by the King's intercession, and the Pope's willingness, to oblige one who had been so sharp an adversary to him, was promoted to the dignity of Cardinal. But afterwards being convicted of a conspiracy with the King's enemies, he was sent to the Tower of *Loches*, where he dwelt twelve years, until *Sixtus Quintus* by great entreaties, and much ado, procured his release. For the like crime, the cardinal of *Prata* underwent the like punishment, in the

reign of Francis the Fifth, and would never, perhaps, have gotten his liberty, had he not deceived his *Physicians* with an opinion of the strangury, by drinking his own urine; when the king fearing the anger of the Pope, if consumed with that disease, a cardinal should die in prison, dismissed him. *Petrus de Vineis*, a chief counsellor of the Emperor *Frederick* the Second, being suspected of intelligence with Pope *Alexander* the Third, the Emperor's enemy, lost his eyes.

Not only designs of usurping the Empire of the East, but also private intercourse betwixt him and *Alaricus*, King of the *Goths*, rebelieved to have caused *Stilicho's* death; which that shameful peace he made with the same *Alaricus*, against the will of the Senate, seems to confirm: *Lampadius* (who always disclaimed it) calling it not a *peace*, but a contract of slavery; whereby the Emperor was obliged to pay tribute to *Barbarians*.

CHAP XXVI.

That our Courtier must not be the Author of hazardous Counsels; the variety of Errors, whereby the Prince's Favor is lost.

THE Courtier whom we are all this while forming, must chiefly beware, that he never be the author of hazardous counsels: for the ill success of these, is always wont to be imputed to the unfortunate adviser, and the good to the fortune of the *Prince*; not only by the vulgar, who judge all things by the event, but also by the *Prince* himself; who is always glad to have some one, upon whom to derive the envy of an unlucky undertaking, and scarce ever willing that any one should share with him in the glory of a prosperous action. A good while before and after *Stilicho's* death, the argument of the public complaint was, his unseemly peace with the *Goths*; until at last, *Olympius*, who had procured his ruin, seeking fame from contrary courses,

broke the truce, *Alaricus* in vain pleading the injustice of the deed ; but afterwards having made war for some time, still with ill success, this very man was, in the opinion of the people, esteemed the author of all their evils ; and at last, being accused by the eunuchs, who were in great favor with the Emperor, he was fain to leave the Court, and fly into *Dalmatia*.

When either the beginning of a war, or breaking of a peace, is treated of, the part of a wise counsellor is to bring argument for both sides, and leave the *Prince* at liberty to make choice of what likes him best. And if he be prest to deliver his opinion, it will be the safer course to incline to peace ; unless invincible necessity, or an apparent *advantage*, persuade the contrary ; which course was prudently taken by *Jovius*, the successor of that *Olympius* we lately mentioned.

He, though he was more inclined to war that so himself might be more necessary to the Emperor ; yet after the manner of some statesmen, seemed to

prefer a peace, having met with *Alaricus* at *Ariminum*, whither he was sent to confer with him; he sends the conditions that *Alaricus* propounded, to *Honorius*; persuading him in other letters apart, that he should offer the command of his armies to *Alaricus*, to make him more reasonable in other things. The Emperor denying, that it was safe for him to commit the strength of his empire to a stranger, that had been hitherto his enemy, answered, that he had rather consent to pay him tribute.

When *Jovius* had read these letters to *Alaricus*, he angry to see himself, and his friendship rejected by *Honorius*, broke off the treaty of peace, and *Jovius* returns to *Honorius*; who being much offended with the insolence of his enemy, swore, he would never have any peace with *Alaricus*; and gave the same oath to all his Courtiers and Commanders. Thus *Jovius* by the same art, removed from himself the envy of the broken truce, and endearing himself to *Alaricus*, by the testimony of his good will, in advising *Cæsar* to give him the command of his

armies, engaged *Honorius* in a war; whereby the power and authority of *Jovius* was wonderfully established. There is in story so great variety of those errors, by the means of which Courtiers have fallen from their *Prince's* favor, that no man's diligence can reckon them all up so; but when he has recounted many, he will find still more behind. Wherefore having here cull'd some of the principal, we leave the rest to the industry and discretion of every observing Reader.

CHAP. XXVII.

Of the Arts whereby Courtiers are supplanted by others; and first, under pretence of specious Employments abroad or of calling them from their Commands, to attend upon the King's Person.

We have seen already, how, by his own fault, a Courtier may lose the *Prince's* favor; let us now show the means,

whereby his enemies are wont to supplant him; which are of three sorts. Either they will endeavour to remove him from the *Court*, under an honourable pretence; or else they will render him suspected, and hateful to the *Prince;* or lastly, will by open force compel the *Prince* to remove him.

Of the first kind of these three; as there are divers ways, so the ends are divers. For some are with shows of honor, or with the desire of living amongst their friends, willingly persuaded to depart the Court. Which course, during the reign of *Manual Comnenus*, *Styppiota* craftily used to remove out of his way *Hagiotheodorita*, who stood in his light: for there arising a controversy between *Michael Pædagogus*, and *Joseph Balsamon*, *Styppiota* persuaded the Emperor that if *Hagiotheodorita* were made governor of *Peloponnesus*, it would put an end to the contention of these great ones. *Hagiotheodorita* out of desire of assisting his kinsman, undertakes the employment; not dreaming that *Styppiota* having gotten his rival out of the way,

would by this means come to the sole management of affairs, as indeed it fell out.

Some men also, tired out with brawls and strifes of their enemies in Court, to provide for their own quiet, easily embrace any plausible employment for a pretence of their *departure*, *as Agrippa* did, who, *Velleius* testifies, went into *Asia*, under the *color* of a great employment, only to withdraw himself from Court, where he had private grudges and heart burnings against *Marcellus*, as the report goes.

Tiberius, whilst *Caius Cæsar* lived, retired to *Rhodes*, on pretence of following his studies, and by his mother's means (they are *Suetonius's* words) to hide the disgrace of it, obtained leave to be sent, as it were, *ambassador* from *Augustus*. If there wants a pretext, whereby he whom you desire to remove, may voluntarily seek leave to go, and esteem it a benefit; the *Prince* must be persuaded to give him some charge as it can be executed by none so well as he: so also if there be any man great and powerful in

any of the Provinces abroad, and have emulators that seek to eclipse him; they must labor to call him thence to Court, as necessary to the *Prince's* person; that so being crowded up amongst the Courtiers, his lustre may be obscured.

This art *Apelles* used towards *Polybius* when he stript *Taurion* of the government of *Peloponnesus*. So *Darius* by the advice of *Megabyzus*, recalled *Hyesteus* out of *Ionia;* not that he had any need of his presence, as he pretended, but to weaken his authority. If these Courtiers would rest contented with removing others out of their way, for their own advancement, and proceed no further, in comparison of many worse, these arts and practices would be something tolerable; but most of them rest not here: in the reign of *Constantius*, *Sylvanus*, general of the foot (as *Ammianus Marcellinus* tells us) by *Arbetio's* procurement was sent to *France*, to chastise the *Barbarians* for the injuries they offered the *Gauls*, whither he being once come, and growing into favor with the Nation, and also rich; the envy of *Arbetio* wrought

at last his utter destruction with the Emperor.

Almost the same fortune under this very Emperor had *Ursicinus*, the general of the horse: *Eusebius*, the eunuch, had with other Courtiers, conspired his ruin; and by these men's means, that he might be far enough from Court, he was sent upon some expedition to the confines of *Persia;* where having staid ten years, *Sabinianus* was sent to succeed him, neither in judgment nor experience equal to the charge: whereupon presently a rumor being spread, that the *Persians* were preparing for war, he was commanded to stay there still, though the power was already given to another. *Eusebius* contriving it so on purpose, that whatsoever good success happened against the *Persians*, might be attributed to *Sabanianus;* and what ever fell out amiss, might be imputed to *Ursicinus*, as the event witnessed; for *Ursicinus* cast down for another man's fault, retired and passed the rest of his life in private. The reign of this Emperor furnishes us yet with another example; for *Ruffinus*,

the uncle of *Gallus*, captain of the guard, was sent to appease a mutiny of the Soldiers out of no other intention, but that he might perish in the rage of the tumult: as *Clytus* complained, that he was sent by *Alexander* against the *Sogdians*, to no other end.

CHAP. XXVIII.

How Calumnies make Men suspected, or hated by the Prince.

THUS much for the first way, whereby Courtiers are by their enemies supplanted, and stript of the *Prince's* favor. Now let us come to the second, which are the calumnies that are used to render us hated and suspected by the *Prince*: In calumny, two things are to be observed; the first is, whether it be sufficient to deprive him of the *Prince's* favor? the second is, whether it be probable? Of the first, we must form our judgment out of the present state of things, the humor and *inclination of the Prince*, and the nature *of the calumny*. No

kind of slander more subverts great men, than that which accuses us of conspiracy against the *Prince's* person; or his Empire, or else of contempt or disdaining to obey, with detraction and derision towards the *Prince*.

These calumnies are likely to be true not only by the words and actions of those who are accused, and of their servants, friends and kindred, but also by contrived letters and the disposition of the *Prince*, too apt to believe the calumny, or too prone to think ill of the person accused; especially if he were ever suspected before. These things which are by calumny converted into a crime, he that is traduced, either did, or said of his own accord, or else was ticed into them, by the sleights of the enemies, and competitors: the knowledge and practice of which malice, whets the wits of those who watch their occasions, and know dexterously how to use them.

There are some men who will put projects into our heads, that if we embrace them, they may make these very things, a subject of calumny against us,

and accuse us to the *Prince* of some wicked intention. There was a certain *Magician*, called *Santabarinus*, very much beloved by *Basilius*, Emperor of *Constantinople*, but as much hated by *Leo*, the Emperor's son; whom, this *Magician* desiring to overthrow, did so besiege him with counterfeited *duties*, and feigned respects, that at last winning upon him, he grew into credit with the young *Prince*: then having got an authority and interest in him, he takes his time, and warns *Leo*, with great art and solicitude wherever he went a hunting with his father, to carry a *poniard* under his garments, to defend himself with. He obeying this advice, the *Magician* goes to his father, informing him, that his son intended to murder him, and for a testimony, told him, that he carried a dagger hidden about him, waiting for an occasion of performing it: in short, the young *Prince* was searched, and the poniard found, whereupon he was cast into prison; and though he was protected by the joint intercession of all

the Court, yet he hardly escaped with his life.

Whilst *Valentinian* was Emperor, *Ætius* accused Earl *Boniface*, who was very dear to *Valentinian*, and governor of *Africa*, *Placidia*, the Emperor's mother, of treachery towards the *Prince*, and of a design he had of subjecting *Africa* to himself: persuading her that he should be recalled quickly. At the same time he warns *Boniface* by his letters, that he was accused at court, and for that reason *recalled*, wherefore he should take heed how he returned, if he loved his own safety. *Boniface* giving credit to him, obeyed him so far, that (resolving to oppose those who would come to reduce him) he called *Gontarus*, King of *Valladolid*, and *Gensericus* his son, then reigning in *Spain*, to his aid; who upon this occasion, possessed themselves of *Mauritania*. The deceipt being afterwards found out, that the truth might appear more plainly, they were permitted the trial of a combat, wherein *Ætius* being vanquished, was banished the Court.

Not unlike this was the craft of *Samona*, beloved by *Leo*, son to the Emperor *Basilius* (by reason of his detection of the treason of *Basilius*, kinsman to the Empress *Zoa*) who resolving to ruin *Andronicus*, who was general against the *Saracens*, caused him to be warned by a friend, that he should take heed of *Hymerius*, who came to deprive him of his eyes; which was in those days a punishment usual towards great persons, whose power was overgrown, and become formidable: *Andronicus* believing this to be true, withdraws himself from *Hymerius*, to a place of strength, which he seized upon. This fact of his, *Samona* did not omit to exaggerate to the Emperor, insomuch, that by his procurement, an army was sent against him, which forced *Andronicus*, driven to despair, to quit the limits of the Empire, and fly to the *Saracens.* A little before, we mentioned *Arbetio*, and it will be worth observing, how he added deceit upon deceit; when he observed the *Emperor* angry with *Sylvanus*, and feared that he should come to *Rome* to clear himself of the

objected crimes, he gives the *Emperor* his letters, wherein he called *Sylvanus* to his presence, to an instrument of his own, called *Apodenius;* who arriving in *France*, suppressed the letters as he was directed, and tells *Sylvanus*, that nothing but destruction hung over him; whereby *Sylvanus* running into rebellion, as the only means of his preservation, made good *Arbetio's* calumnies.

But we have too long been silent concerning *Sejanus*, to whom (being expert in all these tricks) this *artifice* we now treat of was very usual. That he might render *Agrippina* suspected to *Tiberius*, he enveigled her friends to puff up her haughty spirit, and her own kindred were enticed to feed the swelling hopes of *Agrippina* with crooked and perverse discourses: whilst in the interim, he causes *Claudia Pulchra*, *Agrippina's* cousin german, to be accused by *Domitius Afer;* which injury, this fierce and passionate woman, complaining of heavily to *Tiberius*, exceedingly encreased the suspicious of this jealous Emperor. Yet *Sejanus* not content with

this, but seeking the utter ruin of this unwary, and sorrowful lady, sent those to her, who under a show of friendship should warn her, that *Tiberius* meant to poison her, and that she should beware of his feasts; whereupon she refused to take an apple out of *Tiberius's* hand at table, which grievously incensed *Cæsar* against her. By the same *Sejanus* now, when soldiers were set to watch over *Agrippina* and her children, were men suborned to advise her to fly to the German army, or to run to the image of *Augustns* for sanctuary, and there to invoke the help of the Senate and the people.

With the same ugly arts, whereby he endeavoured to supplant this lady, by making her suspected of *Tiberius*, he utterly overthrew her friend *Titius Sabinus*; which thing, as it is described by *Tacitus*, you may read here in his own words, because the circumstances are very notable, *Annal.* 4.

" *Junius Silanus* and *Silius Nerva*,
" being consuls, the year had a foul
" beginning; for *Titius Savius*, an honor-

" able gentleman, of *Rome*, was cast into
" prison only for his friendship to *Ger-*
" *manicus*, which was such, that he never
" omitted any occasion of honoring, or
" serving his wife and children; of all *Ger-*
" *manicus's* followers, being the only man
" who visited them at their house, and
" accompanied them abroad; wherefore
" as he was much praised by the good,
" so was he much maliced by the bad;
" against him, *Latinius*, *Latiani*, *Por-*
" *cius*, *Cato*, *Petelius*, *Rufus*, and *Mar-*
" *cus Opsius*, who had sometime been
" consuls, bent their spight, through a
" desire of the consulship, which they
" could not obtain, but by *Sejanus's*
" means and *Sejanus's* liberty could not
" be purchased but by some notable piece
" of villainy. Wherefore they plotted
" amongst them that *Latiani*, who was
" somewhat akin to *Sabinus*, should lay
" the snare, and that the rest being
" privately witnesses to what past, they
" might begin their accusation.

" Hereupon *Latiani* began at first to
" cast speeches out at random, and to

" extol *Sabinus's* constancy, that he did
" not as others did, fawn in prosperity,
" and shrink from a house in adversity,
" with other honorable mention of *Ger-*
" *manicus*, bewailing *Agrippina's* estate.
" And seeing *Sabinus* (as men's minds
" are soft and tender in calamity) pour
" down tears, and complaints, *Latiani*
" began more boldly to touch *Sejanus's*
" cruelty, pride, and ambition, not
" forbearing to reproach *Tiberius:*
" These seeming dangerous speeches,
" and such as durst not be avouched,
" made a strict friendship in shew,
" betwixt them; so far that *Sabinus*
" often frequented *Latiani's* house, and
" as to his faithful friend uttered his
" griefs to him. Those I mentioned be-
" fore, now began to devise with *Latiani*
" how these speeches might be heard by
" them all: for the place of meeting
" must be in appearance private, and if
" they should stand behind the door,
" they apprehended some noise, or other
" accident of suspicion might discover
" them; wherefore between the ceiling
" and the roof, the three senators (in a

" place no less unseemly than the
" treachery was detestable) hid them-
" selves, laying their ears close to the
" holes and chinks to listen what was
" said.

" In the mean time *Latiani* having
" found *Sabinus* in the market-place
" (as if he had some new matter to tell
" him,) enticed him home into his
" chamber, beginning there to lay open
" things past and present, and to load
" him with new fears. *Sabinus* was not
" behind hand with him, the nature of
" griefs being such that when once we
" enter into them, we can hardly make
" an end. This done, they began im-
" mediately their accusation, and writ
" to *Cæsar* the whole contrivance of
" their own lewd and shameful act. The
" city was never in greater perplexity
" and fear than at that time, every man
" estranging himself from his nearest
" kindred and acquaintance; avoiding
" all meetings and conferences, as well
" with their friends, as strangers; they
" even grew jealous of mute and sense-
" less things, prying into the roofs and

" walls of their houses. But *Tiberius* re-
" questing in his letters that the solemni-
" ties of the new year might be celebrated
" on the *Calends.* of *January*, falls at last
" upon *Sabinus*, charging him that he
" had corrupted some of his freed men
" to attempt something against his per-
" son, and therefore boldly demands
" revenge, which, without delay, was
" granted.

" *Sabinus* being condemned, was drawn
" away with his garments over his head,
" so that he being almost throttled, was
" heard to cry out, *Is this the beginning*
" *of the new year? are these the sacri-*
" *fices slain in* Sejanus's *honour* ? Which
" way soever he cast eyes, they all fled
" whom he directed his speech to; the
" places of assembly and the streets were
" empty, some came running back and
" shewed themselves again, for they were
" afraid. And what days think you now
" were exempt from executions, if
" amongst the sacrifices, and vows,
" when the custom was to abstain from
" profane speeches, fetters and manacles
" were mentioned; it is believed *Tiberius*

" could not be ignorant of the envy
" he should incur for doing so, but that
" he did it on purpose, that the new
" magistrates might open the prisons,
" when they set open their temples and
" altars; for after that he sent letters of
" thanks, because they had punished
" an enemy to the state."

CHAP. XXIX.

Examples of other Treacheries in suborned Witnesses, and forged Letters.

I CANNOT avoid bringing here another example out of the same *historian.* Firmius Cato, a Senator, *and one of* Libo's *inward friends, induced the simple young man, easily led to vanities, to give credit to the* Chaldeans' *promises, the Magicians' ceremony, and the interpretation of dreams, vainly putting him in mind that* Pompey *was his great grandfather,* Scribonia *(who had been* Augustus's *wife) his aunt; the* Cæsars *his cousin germans; and that his house was full of the statues and monuments of his ances-*

tors; he enticed him to licentiousness, to borrow money, making himself a companion of his lusts and familiarities, the better to entangle him and convince with many evidences. That there might be witnesses enough, he also debauched such of his servants as knew any thing of the matter. Then he desires access to the Prince, *and by means of* Flaccus Vesculanius, *a gentleman of* Rome, *one of* Tiberius' *familiars, he discovered both the matter and the man.* After this *Libo* was treated by *Tiberius*, and made much of, till accusations were brought against him in such abundance that he was forced to kill himself; *Tacitus's* Annal. 2. will tell you at large, to whom I had rather refer you, than exceed the bounds I had proposed to myself in this treatise.

Styppiota, whose deceit in supplanting *Hagiotheodorita*, I told you of before, could not avoid being circumvented himself, as *Sabinus* the *Roman* was; the contriver of that plot was *Camaterus Logotheta*, who being an enemy to *Styppiota*, accused him before the Emperor, as an impostor, and one that *intended* to betray

Sicily. And that he might give some face of truth to his calumny, he hides the Emperor in his chamber; and in his hearing begins to discourse of the affairs of *Sicily*. At which time many things fell from the heedless *Styppiota* that were very displeasing to *Cæsar*; not content with this, *Camaterus* causes counterfeit letters to be mingled among *Styppiota's* papers, which being searched by the *Emperor's order*, were the cause of *Styppiota's* condemnation, and the loss of his eyes.

This story leads me to speak of another means of rendering slanders probable, to wit, by counterfeiting letters; a deceit indeed that for the most part breaks out at last to the prejudice of him who uses it, but nevertheless is of great power to make deep impression of suspicion in the *Prince's* mind, and to alienate his favor; which being once observed by the accused, will either induce him to withdraw himself willingly from business, and the court, lest something worse should follow; or else cast him upon such attempts and practices as will confirm the slander,

which appears by that example of *Sylvanus* I mentioned before.

The perfidy of false witnesses is no slender confirmation of slanders, and this is chiefly necessary against such as are accused of treason, and capital crimes; and truly domestic servants, as most proper, so oftenest are made use of in this nature. In the reign of *Arcadius*, *Eutropius* seeing the destruction of *Timasius*, a great captain, and a man of much authority, corrupts his friend, or rather his inseparable companion *Bargus* to accuse him of affecting the Empire. The friendship between *Bargus* and *Timasius* gave credit to the accuser, all men believing that he would not, unless the crime was certain, accuse him; to this, counterfeit letters were added, to prove the treason, by which means the innocent man and his son were sent into banishment to the Isle of *Oasis*, from whence neither of them ever returned.

Caius Petronius was for his skill in pleasures preferred before *Tigellinus* by *Nero*, whereupon the other, out of envy, accused his rival of *Scævinus'* friendship

(who was convicted of a conspiracy against *Nero*), and brought to witness it a servant of *Petronius* corrupted by him.

CHAP. XXX.

Confirmatiou of Slanders under the Colour of a feigned Friendship, and the Inclinations of the Prince *to the* Accuser.

I SAID before, that to confirm *calumnies*, the affection of the *Prince* to the *slanderer* did much conduce, and for this reason did *Sejanus* (endeavouring to make the empress *Livia* jealous of *Agrippina*, *Germanicus's* widow) choose *Julius Postlumus* to do it; who, as *Tacitus* affirms, by reason of his adulteries with *Mutilia Prisca* the Empress's favorite, was very gracious with *Livia*; but calumnies never succeed so easily, as when they are used against one already suspected by the *Prince*: for it is very probable, that then the accuser will not only ruin the other, but also exalt himself. The familiars of

Vitellius durst not set upon *Junius Blæsus*, till they observed him to grow less in *Vitellius's* favor, and they compassed their desires much sooner, because *Lucius Vitellius*, the Emperor's brother, lent them his assistance.

" *Gracchus*, a freedman of *Cæsar's*, " and one, as *Tacitus* says, Anual. 13. all " his life bred up in, and by a long ex- " perience, well practised in the *Prince's* " house, thought it the best way to pre- " serve himself in the favor of the *Prince*, " to accuse *Cornelius Sylla*, whom *Nero*, " he knew was jealous of already. The " same art did *Tigellinus* use against this " *Sylla*, and *Plautus* afterwards, of which " *Tacitus*, Annal. 14, writes thus. But " *Tigellinus's* credit encreased daily, who " thinking that his lewd practices, " wherein he was a great proficient, " would be more acceptable, if he could " engage the *Prince* into the communion " of his villainies, began diligently to pry " into all his fears, and perceiving that " *Plautus* and *Sylla* were above others " suspected : *Plautus* being banished " into *Asia*, and *Sylla* into *France*, he

" entered into discourse of their nobility,
" how one was too near the army of the
" East, and the other to that of *Ger-*
" *many*: that *Sylla* was poor and needy,
" counterfeiting a laziness; and *Plautus*
" abounding in wealth, did not so much
" as pretend a desire of a quiet life."

I told you above of *Ursicinus*, accused by *Eusebius*, the eunuch, to the Emperor *Constantius*, who was already shy towards him, by reason of his kindred to *Gallus*; but I did not set down the success of the cause, which was thus: the accusation faultering, because the arguments, whereby the crime was to be proved, were slender; the eunuch intending a new mischief, causes the accused to be enlarged; and things standing thus undecided, he strives to endear *Ursicinus* to himself, whom he would seem to have delivered from the danger of a *trial*; but removes him from the court (where all his thoughts were placed) notwithstanding this face of friendship he put on, persuading the Emperor under hand against him.

CHAP. XXXI.

The chief Arts and Ways of Slanderers.

WHEN any one is accused of speaking ill of the *Prince*, the nearer these reproaches come to truth, the easier is the accusation credited, as appears in the example of *Granius Marcellus*, of whom *Tacitus*, *Annal.* 1, whom *Cæpio Crispinus* accused of having reviled *Tiberius*, which was an inevitable accusation, for he having chosen out the greatest blemishes of *Tiberius's* life, imposed them upon the accused; which, because they were true, were believed to have been spoken. This example have many slanderers followed, reproaching *Princes* of their vices, under pretence of informing them of other men's detractions; which, one would think, should be a sufficient reason to persuade them from giving ear to these calumniators.

And *Tiberius* though he was a lover of informations, yet he hated his own

reproaches; and therefore lest he should hear them in the *Senate,* where they were occasionally brought in by way of accusing others, retired to *Caprea,* believing (as *Tacitus* avers) that he ought to avoid the assemblies of the *Senate,* lest he should be compelled to hear something reproachful uttered of himself in his own hearing.

This way also some take to reprove *Prince's* for their vices; as they who would reprove *Nero* for his mother's murder, used to inveigh against others for the like acts in his hearing; yet more with a design to correct the fault in *Cæsar,* than to ruin those whom they accuse. These are the choicest ways that slander takes, but who will undertake to trace her in all her turnings: for calumny is a monster that hath a thousand shapes, and a thousand sleights to do mischief with.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Deceits and Danger of Court Praises, and masked Courtiers. Lastly, the third Way of oppressing our Courtier by Force.

FROM Slanders, let us come to Praises, of which also, as we have hinted *before*, *there* is great use in undermining others; for many men by this means, palliate secret hate, envy, and emulation, to deceive more easily. So *Fabius Valens* with secret criminations, defamed *Martius Valens*, who suspected no such thing from him: who to betray him more securely *always spoke* well of him in public, *Tacitus*, Hist. 1. So *Arbetio* with the blandishments of great kindness, did assault *Ursicinus*, and frequently call him in public, *a valiant gallant person*, thereby craftily to entangle in more deadly snares, that harmless, and well meaning man. *Ammianus Marcellinus*, Lib. 15.

Alphonsus, King of *Arragon*, as one was praising another man unreasonably

in his presence, beyond his wont, turning about to a friend, said, *without doubt this fellow seeks the destruction of him he praises:* neither was the king deceived in his opinion, for six months after, this intemperate praiser, accused before the seat of justice, him whom he had so highly extolled; and had undone him, had not the king interposed for his preservation.

Mucianus having in the senate heaped many praises upon *Antonius Primus*, whom he could not openly oppress; loads him also with secret promises, and points him out the further *Spain*, left void for him by the decease of *Cluvius Rufus*, giving his friends and followers several commands in the army. And afterwards when he had filled him with ambition, and desire, he suddenly undermines his power by taking from him the Seventh Legion, which was exceedingly devoted to *Anthony*.

Neither is this way traced by courtiers only, but also by *Princes* themselves, when they desire to abate or take down any body. For *Tiberius* thus conferred

the prætorship upon *Libo* (whom he secretly suspected and hated) without change of countenance or showing anger in his words, till he saw his time (he had so concealed his indignation) as *Tacitus* tells you, Annal. 2. By the same artifice he overthrew *Sejanus: Domitian* was never more to be feared, than when he smiled; the praises of *Andronicus* were the beginning of injuries. *Nicetas* called his liberality an earnest of the confiscation of that man's goods, and his lenity a forerunner of certain death.

Yet there are some who seek by their applauses only, to stir up the *Prince's* envy toward them they praise; for so *Tacitus* tells, *Julius Agricola* was ruined with *Domitian*. "The cause of his des-
" truction was no crime nor complaint
" against him, but the *Prince's* envy to
" the virtues and glory of the man,
" stirred up by the worst kind of ene-
" mies, unseasonable and treacherous
" praises." There is extant, a saying of the Emperor *Julian*, that *there* are no more *dangerous enemies* in the world, than masked Courtiers; whom *Mammer-*

tinus describes in a panegyric, saying, that, with a crafty artifice, they did *in all company*, *slander* men by way of praises, and under the title of friendship.

But we see that some have used these praises towards one, with an intention of reproaching another, whom they desire to affront with the dissimilitude of his merit. *Plutarch* accuses *Herodotus* with this spightful kind of dealing in his commendations of the *Athenians*, for the brave repulse they gave the Persians, which, says he, was not intended so much for the *Athenian's* honour, as the shame and disgrace of the other Greeks. *Seneca* attests, that kings are wont to praise their dead servants, to make those blush who are alive: so did *Augustus* extol the faithful services of *Mæcenas* and *Agrippa*, when his daughter's lusts were discovered, seeking thereby to reprove his familiars and servants, as negligent and careless of the honour and service of their *Prince*.

The same was *Augustus's* end in praising and dispraising *Tiberius*, of whom *Tacitus* writes thus; Augustus *a few*

years before he demanded the tribunical power in the Senate for Tiberius, *in his speech he touched upon many things of his behaviour, his habit, and manner of living; with which, as it were, by way of excuse, he reproached him*, &c. Therefore these things ought to warn us to look as well into the intention of those who praise us, as of those who calumniate us.

These two first ways of undermining our Courtier, to wit, of removing him out of the way, under some fair pretence, or of making him hated or suspected by the *Prince;* being sufficiently discoursed of, there remains only untouched, the third and last way, viz. Open violence; which principally takes place, when either the people, or the soldiery offended with the dignity, or manner of the favourite, run into a public sedition. The tumults of the *Parisians*, when the people raged at the captivity of their King *John*, with the English, are sufficiently known; as also the fortune of those, upon that sedition, who bore the principal offices under his son, then supplying his father's place in the government.

But some years since the *Janizaries*, more than once, have by sedition deprived the *Turkish* Emperors of their ministers of *greatest* trust and authority. Out of more ancient stories, the time of *Arcadius* will furnish us with some examples; *Ruffinus* was amongst others principally beloved by this Emperor, with whom *Stilico* being offended, and determining his destruction, sent *Gainas* with his forces, under pretence of assisting the Emperor, but indeed to deprive him of *Ruffinus*, as it came to pass: for *Ruffinus* going to the army, the soldiers of *Gainas*, upon the signal given, ran together, and compassing *Ruffinus* in, tore him in pieces.

Eutropius was then put in *Ruffinus's* place; when the chief Courtiers likewise grew discontented with him, by the contrivance of the same *Gainas*, *Tribigildus* raises a rebellion, over-running and spoilling all *Asia*, and refusing to accept any conditions of a peace, till *Eutropius* was removed out of the way; to which, by the persuasion of *Gainas*, the emperor at last consented: neither was this

enough, for *Gainas* being afterward openly joined by *Tribigildus*, that he might suffer himself to be reconciled to *Arcadius* the Emperor, demanded, that *Aurelius Saturnius*, and *John Chrysostome*, then the chief moderators of the Emperor's affairs, should be given up to him; which being done, he sent them into banishment, contenting himself with giving them (before their departure out of his presence) the edge of his sword to handle, that they might feel how sharp it was.

CHAP. XXXIII.

Sometimes the Prince's own ill and cruel Nature, envying the Deserts of his Servants, is Cause of the Courtiers Fall.

OFTENTIMES, though Courtiers underprop themselves with all other supports, yet the nature of the *Prince*, being either over light, vain, jealous, envious, covetous, cruel, or timorous, makes their ruin

inevitable. These diseases being incorporated into them, for the most part elude, and overgrow the circumspection of the most prudent men. *Seneca*, whose authority had, with *Nero*, more liberty, than flattery; in the beginning, being wise and skilful in the arts of court, was fain to yield at last. Being quite overcome by tke malice of the *Prince's* nature: first, he was envied by him for his eloquence, then for his riches, and lastly, being oppressed with malicious slanders, he lost both the *Prince's* favor, and his life.

The jealousy and envy of *Princes* has been so formidable to some, that they had rather be lessened to their loss than incur their envy by doing their business prosperously and well. *Publius Ventidius* fearing the envy of *Mark Anthony*, under whom he served, contented himself to have beaten the *Parthians* by three Victories, into *Media*, and would not prosecute his good fortune any farther. *Agathias* tells us, that during the reign of *Justinian*, the same was done by *Bellisarius*; lest the greatness of his

victories, and the acclamations of the people, should stir up the hate of the Peers, and envy of the *Prince* against him.

Truly such as these do not mind their own honor, and the profit of the *Prince* as they ought; but the fault is not so much in them, as in the *Prince* himself, and therefore *Mæcenas* persuaded *Augustus, not to impute his ill successes to his ministers, nor envy their prosperous uctions. For* (says he) *many of them who manage public affairs, have done it very negligently, for fear of envy, choosing rather to hazard their glory, than their safety.* Yet I much more approve their way, who (to avoid envy whatever great and fortunate actions they did) would needs ascribe the glory of it to the *Prince*, though absent. *Agrippa, Augustus*'s son in law, persuades us to undertake great adventures; but, having performed them, to attribute the glory of it to the *Prince*, as he himself always used to do.

Craterus, when the business of *Artacena* was to be determined, waits for *Alexander's*

coming; *Julius Agricola* (as *Tacitus* writes) "never did boastingly apply his "acts to his own glory, but cast all "upon fortune, as the author and guide "of all he did, who was but her ser-"vant."

Envy and emulation, though they are diseases incident to the most generous *Princes* (such as *Philip* and *Alexander*) yet they are more predominant and malignant in some, than others. *Theodosius*, the second emperor of that name, committed the charge of building a wall at *Constantinople* from sea to sea to *Cyrus*, which work he effecting in three-score days: this great dispatch was so grateful to the people, that they proclaimed in the streets, that *Constantine* built the city, and *Cyrus* had restored it; which being heard by the Emperor, brought so great an envy upon *Cyrus*, that he could not expiate it any other way, but by putting on a religious habit.

He who has to do with such *Princes* is to consider, that he walks upon ashes under which fire lies concealed; and therefore *must* still examine their incli-

nations with great diligence, that he may either defend himself against them; or, if he cannot, that he may have his satisfaction of mind at least, that he has done his duty, and all that in prudence he ought.

CHAP. XXXIV.

How to preserve our Favor and Office, with the succeeding Prince.

He is deservedly to be remembered amongst the darlings of fortune, whose authority and interest being great with one *Prince*, continues so with his successor. It is truly a thing very rare in courts, because he that is to succeed, is for the *most part* suspected by the present *Prince*; and therefore they who manage his affairs, are necessitated to be adverse to the heir apparent: from whence, commonly deadly enmities arise. Besides this also, the succeeding *Prince*, has, for the most part, servants known, and endeared to him, by a long fidelity *and many* services; for whose advancement

to dignity that he may make way, he will ordinarily, either of his own accord, or by the persuasion of those who desire to succeed, lay aside the servants of the deceased *Prince*.

Yet there are some, whom either the state of affairs, for which they are more able, and apt than others; or some other *dexterous* quality, and taking humor, so insinuates them into the succeeding *Prince*, that one *Prince* dying, they lose nothing thereby, but his person. *Macro*, that he might obtain *Caligula's* favor, sets his own wife *Ennia* upon him, to inveigle him with love, and bind him in marriage. The same man commanded *Tiberius* to be smothered with clothes, as he was sick and dying, as *Tacitus* affirms. *Julian* the Emperor retained *Arbetio*, because he thought him useful, although he hated him for his pride, and turbulent disposition. And *Valentinian* after him, called the same man to him to oppose against *Procopius*.

We have hitherto treated only of such things as our Courtier, who wishes to enjoy the *Prince's* favor, ought to avoid;

but the sum of all counsels that can here be given to him is, a modesty towards the *Prince, such as* becomes a man, more mindful of his duty, than of his swelling fortune; let him never boast, nor do any thing irreverently; and as much as he possibly can, let him avoid envy; which has been so dreadful to many great men, that some of them pretending a love of ease, others embracing a retirement to study, have shewed themselves averse to public affairs. Examples in both which cases, the *Historians* give us in *Domitian* and *Galba.* He must take heed, he pass not over carelessly, either those treacherous kiud of praises we spoke of before, nor the slanders that are cast upon him; those who calumniate us, say, that either we are wanting in something *necessary to serve* the *Prince* well; or else, that we have said, or done something, *either really or, intentionally* to the prejudice of him, or his service. As to the defects imputed to us, we must either modestly excuse, and justify *ourselves*, or else amend them; or lastly, endeavour with some other virtues to recompense *those wants.* Our

words and actions ought to be so moderated and weighed, that they may not be liable to ill *interpretations*; we ought always to endeavour to search into other men's opinions, and inclinations, before we discover *our own*; and if either by chance or negligence, any thing slip from us which may possibly offend, we must, when we reflect upon it, by some respective means, or by some occasional interpretation, amongst other discourse, let them see, what we spoke was not with an intention of offending any body.

If we once discover, that we are calumniated by any one, we ought as little as possible to be absent from the *Prince*, to whom we are slandered; for besides that, love abates towards those who are absent, detraction also in time takes *root*, if it be not seasonably contradicted with truth; for a jealousy being once put into the *Prince's* head, in time through the many suggestions of the accuser, there being no body to gainsay; takes such footing at last, that oftentimes the *Prince* hates the person accused, before he examines the crime.

He therefore who will provide for his safety, must make himself at court, one friend or more, to defend him in his absence against the dangerous assaults of calumny; but he must take care they be persons of condition and honor, or at least, men of interest, and such as have access to the *Prince's* ear as readily as our enemies. I confess the store of such friends in Court, is but very small, where it is the usual custom, almost amongst all, if not to persecute their companions themselves, at least to suffer them to be oppressed by others. But yet it happens sometimes, that there is one who either out of gratitude for benefits received, or with a desire of obliging us, or else out of hatred towards our accusers, will perform that office.

CHAP. XXXV.

Ostentation of the Prince's Favor, to be avoided: something also concerning our Friends and Followers.

LET our Courtier avoid all *ostentation* of the *Prince's favor*, not only to eschew the envy of the rest of his companions, but also of the *Prince* himself: for lately, when the Grandees of *Spain* went about to supplant Cardinal *Spinosa*, under *Philip* the Second, see with what a wile they circumvented him: they all struck sail to him, they all seemed to acknowledge, that *their fortunes* depended upon his favor; the very domestic servants of the King, shewed themselves very obedient, and ready at his beck; which when the *Prince* observed, he was removed from court, and all that power and greatness which he had acquired, in less than two years fell to nothing.

Let therefore our Courtier learn to be content with a modest train of atten-

dants, and with a rate of living rather beneath the dignity wherewith he is honoured by the *Prince*, than above it: which he must be sure never to exceed. It is unseasonable to lessen your attendants, when your fortune is declining. It availed *Seneca* nothing, after he had lost *Nero's* favor, to hide himself in his private house, and betake himself to his studies, nor to shut out visitants with his pretence of want of wealth. Neither did it advantage *Agricola* to have entered the city by night, with a slender company of followers: wherefore it is necessary, that we put on a face of modesty betimes, and continue so.

Yet although I would not have our Courtier be besieged with too great a *throng* of friends and servants, I would not have him neglect to make many creatures and followers: not to serve him in his pomp, but to support and comfort him, if any adversity should happen; for although an adverse fortune finds few of these proof friends, yet there are for the most part, some among them who will endeavor to shelter and assist

you: if not out of friendship, yet out of respect to their own advantage, which they may well expect from the restoration of your fortune.

CHAP. XXXVI.

How to manage and dispense with the Prince's Favor, Advices, and Comforts in Adversity, with other Rules.

BUT as it is a great content and help *in adversity*, to have *communicated* your *prosperity* freely and generously to many, in using the favor of the *Prince*, to their assistance and advantage, so our *Courtier* is to be warned, that he warily and industriously dispense these benefits: for it is certain, that whatsoever the *Prince* shall at our intreaty do for any man, a great part of it is by him imputed, as done to us. Wherefore, unless the *Prince's* favor towards us, be very large, we must not be too prodigal of sharing it amongst others; and very seldom must we introduce or commend any to the *Prince*, who are not in some measure known to

him, as well as to ourselves, whose deserts we ought first carefully to look into, observing that saying of *Horace*,

Till thou art certain what his virtue be,
In no man's praises be thou over-free;
Lest he transgress, and purchase shame to thee.

Moreover, let those favors also, which you demand for any body from the *Prince*, be fit for the person, and suitable with the times, consistent also with the dignity and emolument of the *Prince*; and lastly, such as you know have been formerly obtained by *others*. If the *Prince* grants it, we must let him see we take it as a great favor done to ourselves; if he refuse, we must take heed that he do not perceive we are offended.

That is also to be observed here, which we have touched upon before, that we must never vainly make shew of the *Prince's* favor, nor give it out that he is governed by us; for we have told you before, how ill that succeeded with some. *Princes*, whatsoever they do, desire to be thought to do it of themselves, without the help and authority of others, especially their subjects.

If the *Prince* lay any weighty command upon us, we endeavor to have it in writing, and as clearly interpreted to us, as possible: we must not omit to represent to him such difficulties before we undertake the business, as we apprehend will occur to us in the execution. If it be a thing committed to us in secrecy, and unfit to be written, we are to repeat the *commands* over and over (yet without absurdity) in the *Prince's* presence, that we may better understand the intention of him that gives them, and also that he may not forget what orders he gave us.

We must also show ourselves ready for the meanest employments the *Prince casts* upon us; for a small matter is often the occasion of a great fortune; and *Princes* would have their commands weighed not by the importance of the affair, but by the greatness and dignity of the giver; being no less incensed at our refusal of slight enterprises, than our declining *great* and hazardous undertakings, when imposed, by him, upon us. When we are attending upon the *Prince*,

we ought to watch diligently, that we be not surprised nor overwhelmed with sudden commands; and to that end we ought to ruminate before hand all things then afoot, and to prepare our mind and understanding for whatever may come into agitation. We must likewise take heed, that we importune not the *Prince* with unseasonable nor impertinent discourses, but only with what we both know to be certain, and judge to be fit for him to hear. When the *Prince* speaks we must appear attentive, not as if we were thinking of something else; not sad, not musing, lest we should seem either to sleight or dislike what he says.

If any one disgusted, or injured by the *Prince*, shall come and make his complaint to us, we must let him see we are sorry for his misfortune: persuading him to patience, and silence, and encouraging him to hope well; lessening the injury, and excusing the *Prince*. But with such as these, we must deal warily, for there are those who counterfeit wrongs and discontents, to see if they can draw any testimony of an ill will to the *Prince*

out of us, that thence they may take an occasion to undo us; others are injured indeed, but yet are weak and imprudent, not being able to conceal what is out of friendship communicated to them in secret.

If our condition be such, that we keep a train of servants, we are to take great care that none of them speak licentiously, either of the *Prince* or his favorites: for many times the servant's fault is cast upon the master, from whom his words and actions are often thought to proceed. Amongst the principal rules of a courtier's prudence, this is one, to discover betimes, the change and diminution of the *Prince's* affection towards us, that the knot of love may rather be gently untied, than cut in sunder. For so many times the cause of our distaste being removed, or worn away, there is sometimes an easy return for us to our former favor, especially, if we seem, either not to remember, or not to have understood the injury.

CHAP. XXXVII.

How to judge of the Constancy, or Change of the Prince's Affection to us.

THAT our Courtier may judge of the constancy of the *Prince's* favor towards him, it is not enough that he know the *Prince's* humor, with the authority *and power*, both of his friends and enemies in Court; but he must principally weigh the original cause of the *Prince's* love towards him: for, if that once cease, or be found more prevalent in another, without doubt, the affection of the *Prince* will either wholly cool, or at least be much diminished.

Yet sometimes it is hard to divine what is the reason, that you are so beloved; and truly, it is sometimes only a fortunate *felicity*, for which no reason can be given, though ordinarily the *Prince's* love arises, either out of similitude of disposition, out of the pleasingness of your *humor* and *manners*, out of

your services done him, or from your *virtue*; or *lastly*, from your *obsequious pliableness to his will.* That love which comes from the similitude, although it *seem* very great for a time, yet it wears out soonest of all; both, because as we have said before the nature of man changes daily with age, or with variety of business; and also, because it is hard to find two dispositions so sympathizing together, as that they differ in nothing; and many times that wherein they differ is of more power to divide them, than all the rest to unite them together.

Yet I know not what star so tunes and tempers some men to the *Prince's* liking, and disposition, that they can hardly, if they would, do any dissonant or displeasing thing to him: and I confess, that these men may make the best harvest, with a *Prince*, of all others; especially, if they know skilfully how to choose and use their times, and how to take in their sails seasonably before a storm.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

The Prince's Favor to Women: Instructions for the Prince's Mistresses; Benefits conferred on Princes, often make those Persons hated by them, with other Documents.

Princes sometimes also bestow this favor on women, according as they are more or less prone to venereal pleasures; but they also frequently fall from favor, if not by their own faults, yet out of the *Prince's* satiety, or finding out a fairer mistress. Wherefore such women as are crafty, are wont to divert *Princes*, from all commerce with other women, especially such as may be likely to entangle the *Prince's* mind; some also, by counterfeiting disdain, and keeping state, have preserved their lover; and lastly, some more audacious and bold, when they saw the *Prince* once truly love them, have kept him still drunk in lust, and drowned in pleasure.

Which arts *Poppæa* practised upon *Nero*, for *when she saw that he was enamored of her, becoming proud, if she entertained him a night or two, it was all she could afford him; saying, she was a married woman, and could not abandon her husband* Otho, *who for his parts and behaviour exceeded* Nero. *That in using a bond-slave, for his Concubine he had learned nothing from that servile familiarity, but baseness and niggardness;* thus *Tacitus* reports her discourses, *Annal.* 13. And soon after, *Annal.* 14. the same *Poppæa despairing of marrying* Nero, *or of seeing him divorced from* Octavia, *as long as* Agrippina *lived: sometimes tauntingly, and sometimes merrily, began to reproach the Prince, calling him a Ward and subject to other's controlment; and said he was so far from the Government of the* Empire, *that he wanted his own liberty.* Some *Princes* mistresses have by this means held their affections faster, than by the dallyings and blandishments of pleasure; yet as I said before, there is no constancy in this kind of affection to be relied on long.

Truly one would think that love, which you have gained by your services, should be stable and more firm, than what comes from flattery or pleasure, as arising from an honest cause; and which being cherished in you, is apt to stir up others to merit by virtuous undertakings. Yet experience often teaches us, that great services have in court been the ruin of those who have performed them; by reason, that *Princes* are wont to hate, those whom they cannot requite. They will not be indebted to a subject, and therefore fly the sight of those who have well *deserved of* them, as if with their looks they reproached them of ingratitude; which is the reason, why the condition of such men in Courts, is much to be pitied; for when they have obliged the *Prince* by any service, they are ashamed to ask a reward, lest they should seem not to have given, but sold the benefit they did him; who in the mean time, as *Princes* are often regardless of the service received, and slow to reward, draws out, day after day, till the memory of the benefit wears out in the

minds of those who were privy to it; whose silent reproaches he feared before.

Which some men observing, have judged it fit, to strike the iron whilst it was hot; and when they were designed for any business to look to their reward before *they undertook* the employment; knowing well, that with *Princes* the hope of future services, is more prevalent to induce reward, than the *memory* of those that are past; and that it is better to be obliged to *Princes*, than to have them, obliged to us; because they believe, whoever they have obliged, to wish well to them, whilst he whom they are indebted to, because he is believed not to love the *Prince* who has denied him, what he pretended to; is recompensed only with hate. This *Commines* tells us, was *Lewis* the Eleventh's opinion.

The love of *Princes* towards the ministers of their pleasure, would seem to be stable; and truly, it is of some continuance, as long as the inclinations of the *Prince* to pleasure continue; but those changing, the affections to those who feed them, change also. Sometimes like-

wise, the *Prince* inclining to the love of virtue, rejects and abominates those who are instruments of his pleasures. But as some of the inclinations of *Princes* are more durable than others, so also is their favor (as I said) of a proportioned continuance, towards the servants of those several inclinations.

CHAP. XXXIX.

Sundry Precepts concerning the Pleasures, and Inclinations of the Prince, &c.

I WILL not touch here upon all pleasures, whereunto the nature of the *Prince* is prone, because all of them are not fit, or apt to have the greatness of any man's fortune built upon them. Those passions that are of any great sway in *Princes* minds, and familiar to them, are three, to wit, wanton love, cruelty, and avarice; the first, as it is more vehement than all the rest, so it is more uncertain, and inconstant: for though the vice, still remains as to the subject, yet it keeps not

fixed still upon the same *object* : nevertheless, many have used this as a foundation, to build their *fortunes* on, not sticking to prostitute their wives, so they might gain the favor of the *Prince* ; as we read in *Tacitus*, that *Otho* did, although it fell not out well with him ; for *Nero* removed him from court, lest he should have a rival there.

Others, that they might bind their *Princes* to them, made themselves witnesses and companions of their wickedness and lusts, by the example of *Tigellinus*. These men do not think that *Princes* have a trick to free themselves of public blame and envy, to sacrifice oftentimes such kind of men to it : and all those servants of their lusts are to expect the same fortune as happened to *Remirus de Orco*, the minister of *Cæsar Borgia's* cruelties : whom at last, *Borgia* caused to be murdered, as guilty of all the ill that he had done.

And from the example of this *Remirus*, we may also read their destiny, who serve the *Prince* in his cruelties ; for the *Prince's* affections seldom endure towards

them, both because he, as it were, daily reads his wickedness *in seeing them, and also is afraid* of them, whom he knows so apt to villainy. *Nero*, although hardened in vice, and of a cruel nature, yet after his mother's death, hated *Anicetus*, as one whose face daily reproached him with his mother's murder.

The affections of avarice are least changeable; the diversity of the object does not vary in these, as in those of love; it is not diminished, but increases with age; and although it is as hateful to the *people*, *as cruelty*, yet it is longer endured, because it covers and cloaks all exactions, under the pretence of public necessity, parsimony, and the common good. Therefore those who upon this score serve *Princes*, may long preserve themselves in their favor, whilst (which is rare in these kind of men) they do not become froward and peevish, nor too much intend enriching themselves.

Frowardness, which for the most part is likewise contumelious, begets hatred both to the *Prince*, and to itself; the author of which, the *Prince* will at last

cast away, to remove the envy of it from himself.

Riches are also obnoxious to envy, not of the people only, but sometimes of the *Prince* himself; who if he be truly avaricious, will hardly be content, till he has squeezed the full sponge, as we read that *Vespasian* was wont to do; but will rather imitate the country clowns, who when they have fattened their hogs, kill and devour them. *France* has seen many such, who being proud and peevish, and making too much haste to be rich, have thereby, and by their insolence, from a great height of fortune, fallen to nothing.

In the time of *Philip le Belle*, *Peter Berchius*, high chamberlain, and treasurer of *France*, was strangled at *Paris*; *Lewis*, *Philip's* son, afterward coming to the *Crown*, *Enguerrandus Marigny* met with the same misfortune; under *Charles* the Seventh, *Gyacensis*, in dignity equal to *Berchius*, was brought to the bar, and afterwards sowed in a sack, and drowned; his successor *Camus Beaulieu* was killed at *Poictiers*; and the same end had

come under *Philip* the first, to *Peter Essart*, if with an hundred thousand *florens* he had not redeemed his life.

I could recount much nearer to us, but I am willing to spare their memory: in the mean time these examples are sufficient to instruct, that as the too great easiness of these ministers brings too great a detriment upon the *Prince's* profit; so their insolent griping, and frowardness, draws hate and destruction upon themselves; and that as we ought not to refuse a just occasion of enriching ourselves, so we must not shew ourselves too greedy after riches, nor amass so much together, as may expose us to the public envy.

CHAP. XL.

Concluding with many choice, and necessary Admonitions.

THERE remains only now untreated of the last cause why courtiers are beloved by their *Princes*; to wit, an aptness and singular ability to *dispatch, and manage*

their affairs; for which reason, when we see that we are become *acceptable to the Prince,* we must consider, whether he love this aptness for business, because of the usefulness and necessity of it; or else, because the *Prince* desires to acquire from us that aptitude to himself. If it be grateful, because it is necessary, his favor to us will endure as long as the necessity remains; but his love, will rather be a forced, than voluntary love.

If we see the *Prince* aspire to the glory of this aptitude for business, there is no doubt, but when he sees, that he cannot *either equal,* or excel us, we shall become an eye sore, and unacceptable to him; for there is in *Princes an* innate desire, as well as in all other men, of *excelling all persons in those arts they addict themselves to;* and therefore no man, is pleased to be excelled in them by his own servant. *Asinius Pollio,* some exhorting him to make a reply to those verses *Augustus Cæsar* had made against him, answered, *that he would not by contending to seem the better scribe, draw his envy upon him who had power to proscribe*

him. There arising a dispute once between *Favorinus* the Philosopher, and the Emperor of *Adiran*, about some word wherein the Philosopher at last seemed to yield; his friends wondering at it, he said, *I am not ashamed to be overcome in knowledge by him who commands thirty Legions.*

To this purpose, that saying of *Solomon* is very notorious, *do not seem wise before the King.* It is necessary therefore, that whosoever desires to purchase a *Prince's* favor, must set aside the desire of his own glory: and not only in verbal disputes, but in every thing else, yield him the day; and to that end, it will not be amiss to commit some errors, and oversights; so that they be not too gross nor like to take too much from our repute.

Out of our discourse hitherto, it is evident, how little certainty is in all the greatness and favor at *Court;* wherefore the best counsel that can be given to all *Courtiers*, is, *to prepare themselves for their fall;* for although it is thought a more generous thing to fight, than fly,

when you are once entered these lists; yet if you are to do it with greater hazard of danger, than hope of *success*, it is not indiscreet to sound a retreat betimes, and in imitation of the *Parthians*, to fight flying.

As it is also a more glorious thing to descend gently by steps, and, as it were, *to go out at the door*, than be cast headlong out at the window; so it is less shameful, under color of some specious and contrived pretences to bid adieu to your honors and offices, than to expect to be stript disgracefully of them. And hereunto may fitly be applied the saying of an ancient *Roman*.

Why dost thou weary tired Fortune so?
Depart the Court, before thou art forced to go:

Seneca says, it is happiness to die in the midst of your felicity; but I think that Courtier happy, who in the midst of his prosperous race, makes a retreat. Perhaps he that does so, will not be applauded by all, but by some who look upon the outsides of things, be judged unworthy of the fortune he has so aban-

doned. Yet he who is wise, not regarding such idle discourses, will provide for his own safety, and remember, that in all games, it is better to give out a winner, than a loser; as also, that no prudent man will exchange or adventure certain things, for things so very uncertain.

Though our ascent to these heights of *fortune* and *dignities* is, as it were, by steps in order; yet our descents, if not timely foreseen, are for the most part headlong, and sudden: so that those who are flourishing in favor and authority, if they chance once to slip, or stumble, their falls are alike desperate and fatal.

Behold here the Compendium of all, that I desire to say, for our Courtiers instruction: whether these precepts be pertinent, and select or no, I will not determine, but leave that to the judgment and experience of my friends. For my own part, I confess, I have at present no great use for them, and am so far from being transported with sadness at my private and retired *condition*, that I heartily say with *Seneca*;

Let him that pleases, stand upon
The slippery battlements of Court:
I'm well content to live alone,
Obscure, and free from all resort.
A sweet retirement I desire,
To all things that are great unknown:
Where I to Virtue may aspire;
Therewith my latter days to crown.
That so when Time hath stol'n away
My health, and scarcely left me breath,
Without disturbance, find I may
A quiet, and a happy death.
And that may cheerfully embrace,
As being terrible to none,
But those, who known in every place,
Die only to themselves unknown.

FINIS.

London: Printed by W. Bulmer and Co.
Cleveland-row, St. James's.

ERRATA.

Page 3, line 7, for *oeing*, read *being*.
—— 22, end of line 3, insert *a*.
—— 29, line 7, for *shonld* read *should*.

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MDZ Münchener DigitalisierungsZentrum Digitale Bibliothek

Refuge, Eustache <<de>>,

Arcana aulica: or, Walsingham's manual of prudential maxims for the statesman and the courtier

London 1810

Ph.pr. 1254 d
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